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Global Structural Policy For Africa's Development?

Taking A Hard Look At The EU Africa Strategy

Imprint

Global Structural Policy For Africa's Development? Taking A Hard Look At The EU Africa Strategy

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Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Hiroshimastr. 17
D-10785 Berlin
Germany
Tel.: +49 — (0)30 — 26935 — 919
Fax: +49 — (0)30 — 26935 — 959
E-Mail: ralf.hexel@fes.de
Internet: www.fes.de
Contact: Ralf Hexel

terre des hommes

Ruggenkampstr. 11a
D-49084 Osnabrück
Germany
Tel.: +49 — (0)541 — 71010
Fax: +49 — (0)541 — 707233
E-Mail: p.eisenblatter@tdh.de
Internet: www.tdh.de
Contact: Peter Eisenblätter

World Economy, Ecology and Development (WEED)

Torstr. 154
D-10115 Berlin
Germany
Tel.: +49 — (0)30 — 27594405
Fax: +49 — (0)30 — 27596928
E-Mail: weed@weed-online.org
Internet: www.weed-online.org
Contact: Klaus Schilder

Photos: Jens Schicke

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Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries	EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
AMIS	African Mission in Sudan	ESA	Eastern and Southern Africa
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union	ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
APF	African Peace Facility	EU	European Union
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism	FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
AU	African Union	GCAP	Global Campaign for Action Against Poverty
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development	GDP	Gross Domestic Product
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy	GNI	Gross National Income
CBI	Cross-Border Initiative in Eastern and Southern Africa	GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
CEMAC	Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Central	HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy	IDP	Internally Displaced Person
CLISS	Comité Permanent Interétats de Lutte Contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel	IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
OMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	ILO	International Labour Organization
CSO	Civil Society Organisation	IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
DAC	Development Assistance Committee	IMF	International Monetary Fund
DC	Development Cooperation	JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation	LDC	Least Developed Country
DG DEV	Directorate-General Development	MDG	Millennium Development Goal
DG RELEX	Directorate-General External Relations	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
DIE	German Development Institute	NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
DITF	Darfur Integrated Task Force	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations	OAU	Organisation of African Unity
EAC	East African Community	ODA	Official Development Assistance
EBA	Everything But Arms	OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
EC	European Community	PSO	Peace Support Operation
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	REC	Regional Economic Community
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office	SACU	Southern African Customs Union
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	SADC	Southern African Development Community
EDF	European Development Fund	SLM/A	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights	SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	SSR	Security Sector Reform
EP	European Parliament	TDCA	Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
		UEMOA	Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine
		UK	United Kingdom
		UN	United Nations
		US	United States
		WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
		WEED	World Economy, Ecology & Development
		WTO	World Trade Organisation

Foreword

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Sub-Saharan Africa is currently the poorest sub-continent. Most of its 48 countries have little prospect of achieving the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which would mean, for example, sharply reducing, by 2015, the share of the population living on less than a dollar a day, lacking access to basic education and health services or suffering from malnutrition. In addition, and related to the resilience of poverty, governance is still weak in many African countries, though a number of them have made progress in terms of democratisation. And many are plagued by serious problems of public security or even civil war.

Africa is also a continent neighbouring Europe. The crises there inevitably have repercussions for the European Union (EU). One clear sign of this is the large number of Africans who try to bypass EU immigration controls and to reach Europe, seeking a better life as well as ways to support their relatives at home. Moreover, weak and failing states, many of which are in Africa, have come to be regarded as endangering international security – for example because transnational criminal or terrorist networks might operate from them. Thus Africa, which has for the EU long been mainly a case for development engagement, is now receiving increasing attention from foreign and security policy.

But a consistent European strategy to address Africa's crises has been lacking. This is partly due to the fact that EU member countries are independent actors in important areas: The EU has only one

common trade policy, but its development policy and the nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy are paralleled by corresponding national policies of member states, while immigration is chiefly a national responsibility. Also, policies of the European Commission in different areas may work at cross-purposes – for example agricultural subsidies, trade policy and development policy.

To remedy this, the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament in December 2005 signed a new common EU Africa Strategy. It is meant to be a guideline for all policies relevant to Africa of both the European Commission and the EU member states. While it centres on helping Africa achieve the MDGs, it puts considerable emphasis on peace and security as well as good governance. To what extent is this strategy a step forward, rather than a shopping list of already existing approaches? What are its strengths and weaknesses? Is the strategy likely really to make EU policies relating to Africa more coherent?

These were some of the questions dealt with at a conference organized by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, terre des homes and World Economy, Ecology & Development (WEED) in Berlin in April 2006. The statements made at this conference and the discussions conducted there are presented in this publication. The annex documents the EU Africa Strategy of December 2005. With this publication we hope to contribute to a wider discussion on the future of Europe's relations with Africa.

Ralf Hexel, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Peter Eisenblätter, terre des hommes
Klaus Schilder, WEED

I. The EU Africa Strategy – A Convincing Response to the Challenges in the Partnership with Africa?

Siegmar Schmidt

On December 19, 2005, the EU Ministerial Council published an EU Strategy for Africa entitled: “The EU and Africa: Towards a strategic partnership”. After nearly 50 years of intensive development co-operation, this is the EU first political strategy for Africa.

The aim of this contribution is the presentation and evaluation of the strategy's main contents according to the following key questions:

- Which aims, principles and instruments are contained in the strategy? Is the strategy a step forward on the previous EU policies towards Africa?
- Can the emphasis and priorities of the future EU policy for Africa be determined?
- Is the strategy realistic, i.e. is it an appropriate strategy to meet the challenges on the continent?

Since the EU Strategy for Africa did not emerge from a non-political sphere but resulted from internal EU dialogue as well as from external impulses, the development process of the strategy will be presented first. The EU commission's extensive proposal on an Africa strategy is also of special significance for a further expansion of the strategy. The main emphasis of the presentation lies in the following chapter, which gives a detailed description of the contents of the strategy in several sections, including short comments. This section will refer primarily to the political areas of peace and security as well as human rights and governance. The areas development as-

sistance, economic growth and trade as well as investing in people will be briefly summarized. In conclusion, the strategy will be embedded in the context of the EU policy for Africa and subjected to a critical review.

Background: the internal discussion and external impulses

The strategy is the result of the Union's long term efforts to formulate a coherent policy towards Africa that adequately meets the current challenges. On the one hand it is the result of an internal discussion and policy designing process that lasted for several years. Different basic documents and statements from EU institutions emerged from this process. Among these were the EU Security Strategy in December 2003 and the European Consensus. On the other hand, the EU reacted to external impulses, especially the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). An important impulse for a conceptual revision of the previous Africa policy came from the British government, which held the Council presidency until the end of 2005 and chaired the G8 Summit at Gleneagles. The activities of the British government towards Africa had increased during recent years, as the constitution of the “Commission for Africa”, founded by Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2004, shows. Considering the strenuous negotiations on the Financial Framework 2007-2013, and its foreseeable failure, the Blair government also tried to achieve a positive balance for their Council presidency and strengthened their efforts to actively push for an Africa Strategy in the Coun-

cil. The British initiative was supported by the general readiness of the EU member states (and the EU-institutions) to demonstratively show unity after the Union's split with regard to the Iraq question, and to prove the EU capacity to act on the neighbouring continent. Africa is also the continent with little or no conflicts of interest between the EU and the US so that there are possibilities for the EU to act.

The Millennium Development Goals defined by the UN in the year 2000 oblige the UN member states to make increased efforts, especially in reducing poverty, and improving health care and education. The aims – which included the reduction of poverty by half by 2015 – are said to be over-ambitious and thus cannot be met. The results so far indicate that the MDGs will not be met by African states, especially. The EU Security Strategy in December 2003 reaffirmed the EU aim to take over responsibility as a global player for international security. A main idea is the close interconnection between security and development: security is a prerequisite for development. Development is impossible if there are wars and violent conflicts. The indirect security threats from Africa include the worsened poverty situation in Africa, regional conflicts and the collapse of states. The EU explicitly mentions the conflict in the region of the Great Lakes. According to the EU, this conflict could promote extremism, terrorism and organised crime. Bad governance is considered one of the main causes for the collapse of the state in Liberia and Somalia. The Security Strategy relies on a combination of civil and military measures and instruments and clearly differs from the US' National Security Strategy, which emphasises military instruments and “pre-emptive defence”. The EU Commission attempts to summarize the basics of European development co-operation (DC) in a document titled “The European Consensus” in July 2005 which received a lot of attention. The Commission especially emphasizes that the EU's DC (development co-operation) is a value-oriented policy based on human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance. The Com-

mission explicitly acknowledges the MDGs, which practically serve as guidelines and determine the direction of the EU's DC. The Commission again refers to the interconnection between development and security. For the first time, the terminology of “difficult partnerships” is described extensively. The co-operation with a country is thus considered difficult if the authorities of the country concerned are thought to not to engage sufficiently in poverty reduction, if there are cases of weak governance, corruption and political oppression or the state institutions appear to be incapable of guaranteeing the citizens' safety. This suggests a deviation from the previous principle of co-operation and a stronger differentiation of the DC towards groups of countries with similar status or individual countries. Thus, the Commission favours country strategies with a specific emphasis for each country. Additionally, the Commission calls for new concepts in certain areas, for instance in migration. On the whole, the European Consensus already contains several elements that were included in the Commission's proposal and the strategy adopted in December.

The proposal by the EU Commission and the statement by the European Parliament

In October 2005, just shortly before the strategy was adopted, the EU Commission published an extensive proposal for the Strategy for Africa. The paper started with the sentence “Africa is on the move”. The most visible expression of the changes in Africa are the new elites and the efforts for continental integration within the framework of the African Union (AU), founded in 2002, as well as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). These changes require a new adequate strategy from the perspective of the Commission. According to the Commission, the aim of the strategy is to create a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the African continent. The document starts with an extended and differentiated analysis of the social, economic and political situation in Africa. In parts, this analysis



Siegmund Schmidt, challenging the EU Africa Strategy

refers to the academic discussion and to research and shows strong similarities with the European Consensus. For instance, a differentiation is made between successful countries, countries of conflict and fragile states, countries rich in resources, and the anchor countries that are important for co-operation. A special significance of the latter is attached to South Africa. This country is seen as a strategic partner of the EU and its role for the integration efforts on the continent is emphasized. The EU Commission views the country as having a global role as a representative of Africa and of the developing countries as a whole. This extremely positive perception of South Africa also explains why the country was not criticised publicly by the EU for its quiet and so far unsuccessful diplomacy with regard to Zimbabwe. Politically, the EU sees no alternative to South Africa as a partner.

The heterogeneity of the map of African requires the implementation of a variety of different instruments, according to the Commission.

The core of the Commission document is a three-fold strategy to achieve the MDGs. It is based on the four co-operation principles of equality, partnership, ownership (without mentioning the currently discussed budget aid at this point) and subsidiarity. The three

pillars of the EU Strategy for the MDG in Africa are:

- Promotion of security and peace through co-operation in the area of security. This covers a broad field from conflict prevention to the establishment of African capacities for conflict management. From the Commission's perspective, the prerequisites of this development also include support for legitimate and effective governance, based on adherence to human rights and democracy.
- Establishment of an economic setting that promotes development with the objectives of growth, macro-economic stability, increased South-South-trade through regional integration, improvements in market access, promotion of private enterprise and agriculture. The economic part of the strategy does not rely so much on the controversially discussed "big push" – massive transfer of capital – to Africa, and instead relies on a variety of mostly traditional measures and focus points. New ideas are the infrastructure partnership and the special emphasis on establishing cross-border trans-African networks.
- The third pillar is practically a residual category that lists DC, sev-

eral aims for poverty reduction, humane employment, sustainable and resources-conserving development, health care and education as direct measures to tackle the MDGs.

The Commission proposal for an EU Strategy for Africa reinforces known targets and summarizes the previous aims and programmes of European DC under the common umbrella of the MDGs. Even if there are interesting novelties or certain aims are emphasized, it is mostly a case of relabelling in an attempt to establish a link between the aims and programmes and the MDGs. This is not basically wrong, since the MDGs should not be considered in isolation. But this does not produce an achievable operational strategy for practical policies.

The last part of the extensive document affirms the intended significant increase in financial means for Africa. Since this part has been taken over from the Council into the strategy, it will not be dealt with further in this text. The important part is an extended section including several single measures proposing a reform to increase aid efficiency. At one point, this is criticised as cumbersome. The Commission recommends an action plan to increase efficiency.

An interesting point is that the Commission agrees on a budget aid in principle but wants to make the aid dependent on adherence to good governance principles, and the Commission emphatically rejects this aid for so-called fragile states – unlike the IMF.

The Commission's proposal is an important document especially with regard to the analysis of an extremely heterogeneous development on the continent. This view can also be made for the contents with some restrictions: On the one hand, the Commission proposal presents several innovative elements and sets some focuses, for instance in security. On the other hand, the effort to establish a framework for DC with reference to the MDGs is commendable, although it mainly serves as a legitimation of existing policies and sets up a framework for a strategy that is to be defined more concretely.

The reaction of the European Parliament (EP)

The European Parliament published a statement on the Commission proposals on October 27, 2005, only 2 weeks after their publication. On the whole, the EP welcomed the proposals and affirmed the necessity for an EU Africa Strategy. The EP called even more explicitly for a subtly differentiated strategy than that requested by the Commission. This differentiation is between well-performing states, which will receive budget help in co-ordination by donors, and fragile states, where aid will be more concentrated in specific sectors. According to the EP, a "one size fits all" strategy will not achieve positive results. In the explanatory statement of the EP document, the Commission is indirectly accused of concentrating on its concept of functioning, well-performing states and neglecting the problem of how the structural stability of fragile states can be achieved. The areas of economy and trade are given considerably greater emphasis than the Commission's special focus on the area of security. However, the EP followed the Commission's opinion, and voted for a reinforcement of the Peace Facility for financing African peace-keeping missions within the context of the AU. There is agreement with the Commission on the question of human rights and democracy as a basis of businesses. The text clearly reaffirms the use of political conditionality. The EP reminds the member states of their obligation to take note of the decision to terminate co-operation in the context of article 96 in the Cotonou Agreement.

The criticism of the lack of coherence between the EU's DC and other EU policies and between the EU's DC and the national development policies has already become almost traditional. This is substantiated in as much as the EP calls attention to the need to coordinate the Africa strategy with other forms of co-operation, such as the Cotonou agreement.

The EU Africa Strategy

Initially it is striking that the strategy is very short, covering only 7 pages of text in comparison with the extensive Commission proposal amounting to

more than 40 text pages. Nevertheless, the demands set by the text are high. Firstly, the medium-term time horizon for the strategy is set up to the year 2015. Secondly, the year 2015 refers to a general objective of the strategy to contribute to achieving the MDGs. Thirdly, the strategy is valid for all of Africa, including North Africa. Fourthly, it sets out the political framework for the whole of the EU and thus provides binding targets both for EU policies as well as the national Africa policies of the member states. The strategy lists the following five areas for action:

- Peace and Security
- Human Rights and Governance
- Development Assistance
- Sustainable Economic Growth, Regional Integration and Trade
- Investing in People

Peace and Security

Security is mentioned first to indicate its great importance. The significant value attached to peace and security is explained as being an elementary precondition for development as presented in the Commission document. The EU particularly declares itself ready to cooperate with the AU. The EU announces that it plans to replenish the Peace Facility which was already established in 2004 (until now with a budget of 250 million Euro) and to improve the capacities of the African Stand-by Force by training etc. Here, reference is made to the training programmes of some member states which are already running (France, Great Britain). Besides capacity improvement, the EU also agrees to support peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions of the AU or sub-regional organisations such as ECOWACS or SADC with military interventions within the framework of the CFSP and ESDP. The EU Battle Groups are specifically mentioned with regard to crisis missions. The civilian components of interventions (among others, police operations) will be strengthened and inter-operationality will be produced between the emergency aid organizations of EU member states and other protagonists within the context of the ESDP Africa

Action Plan of June 2004, which is based on the EU Security Strategy. More detailed announcements concerning the civilian components of conflict management, which traditionally were extensively developed within the EU framework, were not made. The EU promises to support the UN Peace-building Commission that is based on the Brahimi-Report for post-conflict reconstruction efforts, and to support programmes in the area of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, and in reforming the security apparatus of the countries. Additionally, the EU Code of Conduct for arms exports, and especially the export restrictions of 1998 for small arms will be made more effective, through, among other measures, improved border management but also by inclusion of non-EU states (possibly, for example, Belarus and Ukraine) from which weapons are delivered to areas of tension in Africa. Only the last part of this section is briefly devoted to fighting terrorism. The implementation of UN regulations and the AU Anti-terrorism Centre in Algeria which is primarily dedicated to the collection of information and research on terrorism will be supported, and this is strongly supported by Austria at present.

Human Rights and Governance

Alongside security and peace, the EU considers respect for human rights and democratic principles and the construction of effective institutions as a second essential precondition for successful development. The EU declares that it plans to continue the existing programmes, some of them quite extensive, such as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which is not explicitly mentioned in the text. This particularly includes measures to protect "vulnerable groups" (women, children), promoting the rule of law, including international jurisdiction, civil society, parliaments and monitoring of elections. Nevertheless, some changes can be seen: the strikingly strong emphasis on good governance which will be promoted in three areas: The EU will increase the financial means for the promotion of effective institutions and capacity-build-

ing from 35 to 50 million euros. This derives from the European Development Fund and should benefit the construction of capacities within national and AU frameworks. Additionally, the EU plans to set up its own governance facility to support reforms following the results of the APRM (African Peer Review Mechanism). Here, the EU is attempting to make the APRM more attractive for states willing to reform. A large section is devoted to fighting corruption and crime. The EU declares its support for the relevant UN programmes, the Kimberly Process and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), among others.

The visible trend to an increasingly strong politicization of policies towards Africa since the middle of the 1990s, which was traditionally marked by development co-operation, is being continued as the two areas of the EU-Africa policy mentioned first in the document, peace and security as well as human rights and good governance show. Like the Commission proposal, the Strategy assembles and reaffirms the previous declarations and documents and only sets new accents in some areas. The "revolution" in the EU Africa policy happened earlier. The provisions in the Lomé IV/2 Agreement of 1995 and the foundation of the EIDHR were important steps in the area of human rights, and the humanitarian intervention in Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo ("Operation Artemis") in the area of security represented a kind of „taboo break“ that strongly relativised the previously held EU principle of "African solutions for Africa's problems". However, despite all the continuity in political relations, some changes in accentuation can be observed, primarily in the area of promoting human rights and democracy: The Africa strategy contains no indication of how the Union should relate towards states that violate the EU basic norms. Thus, a central instrument of the EU democracy and human right policies is not mentioned at all - the reduction or complete abandonment of co-operation within the context of political conditionality - even though it is expressly written into all agreements with third party states.

With the upgraded appreciation of the governance dimension, understood in terms of capacity building, the EU engagement is shifted towards politically less explosive issues such as open calls for the promotion of democracy and human rights, since good governance is also more strongly perceived as a technical, and culturally neutral concept. The two areas also clearly show the high importance the EU attaches to the co-operation with the AU, to sub-regional organizations and to NEPAD.

Development Assistance, Economic Growth and Trade

The EU promises a considerable increase of assistance in the area of the development co-operation: For the EU 15, the present proportion of development assistance of 0.36% of GNI (2004) will be increased to 0.56% of GNI in 2010 and 0.7% in 2015. On average, the proportion of the ten new members will increase to 0.33% of GNI by 2015. Half of the additional means, 20 billion euros, will go to Africa. Additionally, within the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), Africa will be relieved of up to a maximum of 42 billion euros in debt. Member states may impose a special tax on plane tickets to finance these increases. This measure remains voluntary. A call by some member states, for example Denmark, to make this obligatory was not implemented. Meanwhile France has introduced such a tax and estimates that it will raise approximately an additional 200 million euros for DC. It remains to be seen the extent to which these impressively high promises will be able to be implemented in view of the possible limited absorption capacities of African states. What is more important, however, is how difficult it will be for countries such as France and Germany to keep their promises considering their budgetary situations and the possibility of domestic resistance. The strategy means an enormous financial burden for the new member states that so far have only been able to provide small contributions to development aid, and requires a general rethinking for the countries in respect to their previous status as recipient countries. In the evaluation of how the EU member states achieve

these ambitious financing targets, it will be important to carefully analyse the figures they provide. It is possible that both previous and new members will attempt to reach the promised amounts through „accountancy tricks“ such as reallocation of payments, imputing debt relief and allocating previously promised means, etc.

The EU has additionally announced the 10th EDF, promising rapid implementation. The suggestions of the Commission to improve aid effectiveness by reducing bureaucracy and to reform the complicated, time-consuming payment modalities are only addressed very indirectly in this announcement.

In the economic area, the Council took up the Commission proposal for setting up an infrastructural partnership focusing on transport, information technology, energy and water supply. The wording on commercial relations remains vague: the EU reiterated its support for Africa in the context of the WTO Doha round and intends to complete the negotiations for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African regional organizations by 2008 and to set up a free trade area with the Mediterranean states by 2010. In view of the currently extremely difficult negotiations on EPAs, these deadlines appear to be not very realistic at present. The overall objective of the EU is to integrate Africa more strongly into the world economy, and this coincides with the aims of NEPAD. The establishment of a Euro-African Business Forum and the promise to provide an additional 1 billion euros for aid for trade are further intentions presented in the document.

The section entitled “Investing in people” presents very different measures and programmes in the areas of education, food supply, health care and fighting AIDS. These are more or less consistent with the MDGs. The MDGs are not mentioned any more at this point of the document. In the area of health care, the EU introduces a positive conditionality by providing grants to those African governments that focus their efforts on health care and whose health expenditure amounts to a proportion of 15% of the budget. Most promises and announcements are merely a reaffirmation of previous commitments.

However, there is a strong emphasis on migration policy. Considering increasing numbers of refugees from Africa to Europe and the dramatic events in the Spanish enclaves in Northern Africa, the EU suggests an extended dialogue with the AU and announces further concrete steps. These steps are not explained. An interesting idea is that the African diaspora in Europe could provide a contribution to development.

In the area of tertiary education, the EU is ready to support the establishment of the AU Nyerere programme for student exchange. This student exchange programme provides an exchange for students between African countries. The Commission's suggestion to enable a pilot scheme in the tradition of the EU ERASMUS Programme for the exchange between African and European students and teachers and to contribute to a Euro-African university network was not adopted.

In the last section of the document, the EU Commission describes the implementation of the strategy as well as further steps. For the implementation of the strategy, detailed plans with concrete measures for review and indicators, that are to be set up in co-operation between the Secretariat of the European Council and the Commission. The progress in implementation and the aid volume targets are to be discussed in December 2006 and afterwards reviewed every two years. The strategy is to be developed “in partnership” in co-operation with AU and NEPAD. The European-African Summit in Lisbon, originally planned for 2004, should be carried out as soon as possible. The postponement shows that relations are still tense, since the Summit had to be cancelled due to irreconcilable differences of opinion on the participation of a delegation from Zimbabwe: The African states favoured their participation but the EU rejected it. The conflict also affected co-operation in the parliamentary assembly and has still not been resolved.

Conclusions:

A convincing response to the challenges in the partnership with Africa?

After a discussion process lasting several years, the long-awaited EU Africa Strategy is definitely a disappointment in comparison to the Commission's detailed proposal. The strategy is disappointing for the following five reasons:

a) No definition of European interests.

On page 7 the EU concludes that “Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa”, but there is no further explanation what the concrete interests are. Interests in security and ecology as well as trade and value interests are only indicated implicitly. The insufficient definition of the existing interests can contribute to a loss in legitimacy for politics in those countries that are not as involved in Africa for historical reasons. An example is the current public discussion in Germany on the military mission in Congo. Several members of parliament from all political parties are sceptical about or even reject the mission since the government did not provide a sufficient explanation for the motives and aims of the mission.

b) Lack of country or region specific strategies.

A “one size fits all strategy” is problematic and ignores the highly differentiated political and economic environment on the continent. The Council mostly ignores the discussion on the very heterogeneous development in Africa and the subsequent need for a differentiated strategy. This discussion was referred to extensively in the “European Consensus” and the Commission proposal. The Commission's differentiation attempt with the term “difficult partnerships” is also not elaborated in the text. The issue of so-called fragile states and the “bad performers” the EP strongly focuses on is mentioned briefly in the part on security and peace but not described any further. Last but not least, the strategy ignores its own objective that the strategy should take “into ac-

count regional and country-specific needs and African countries' national strategies.” (p. 2).

c) “Shopping list” character

To a high degree the strategy looks like a shopping list which lists many principles, aims and instruments without a clear structure. The strategy lacks any sequencing and priorities of the wide spectrum of measures. Unlike the Commission proposal, there is no attempt in this document to systematically link the aims and principles with the MDGs. On the whole, the strategy must be seen as a kind of general framework defining some general aims and principles in various sectors of the co-operation.

d) The adequateness and the success of the EU strategy depend to a large extent on functioning and effective African institutions.

A main pivotal point of the EU strategy is co-operation with African organisations, especially with the AU in the areas of peace and security and in the area of governance with NEPAD. Both organisations are still in a difficult building and self-constitutional phase. Both the organisational infrastructure as well as financing are not sufficient so far to reach the highly ambitious aims. This is especially apparent in the case of the AU Darfur Mission with 6000 soldiers who were not able to sustainably contain the violence in the region. According to the EU, if the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisations (and also subregional organisations such as the SADC) is not strengthened, the EU Strategy will not succeed.

e) Lack of coherence between different regional EU policies

The EU Strategy for Africa is intended to be a strategy for the whole of Africa. Therefore, it acknowledges new continental organisations such the AU and NEPAD as well as the increased activity of North African states within these organisations. There are several existing agreements between the EU and different regions in Africa and with various African states, some of

them adopted decades ago, and these agreements are affected by the strategy. For instance, the Cotonou Agreement, that is particularly important to Sub-Saharan Africa and the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa. North African states are linked to the EU via the Barcelona Process or the Euro-mediterranean Programme and the European Neighbourhood Policy (Tunisia and Morocco at first) and Egypt is linked through a free trade agreement. With regard to establishing coherent policies, it will be necessary to synchronize these agreements and treaties with the EU Strategy for Africa and to ensure they are compatible with each other. However, the understandable intention of creating a strategy for the whole of Africa and thus also for North Africa, which was not part of the Cotonou agreement to date, could be problematic. Secondly, it would require a restructuring of the Commission's competences. For instance, there are clearer and stronger European interests in these countries than in small countries such as Lesotho and Malawi in Southern Africa, because of the geographic situation and the status of these countries as emerging markets as well as the economic significance of these countries for Europe. For these reasons it will be difficult to follow consistent policies towards "Africa". The competences within the European Commission have also not been directed towards an approach for the entire continent up until now. Currently, the Belgian Louis Michel is responsible for development co-operation within the Cotonou agreement and SSA, and Foreign Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner deals with Northern Africa.

In view of its contents, the strategy reveals few new points, since it is an attempt to summarize well-known EU positions in a framework document.

Nevertheless, the strategy could be an important contribution to the Union's Africa policies. The fact that there was an agreement on one strategy is already remarkable since there are diverging interests among the member states, and the complex, fragmented formation process

for policies within the CFSP and ESDP makes it more difficult to define binding foreign policy strategies. Considering the broadly prevalent Afro-pessimism, the strategy could also be seen as a clear commitment of continuing support for Africa, as a political signal or political symbol. The EU wants to continue to take care of the continent's fate and agrees to support positive approaches in Africa.

Thirdly, the strategy does identify adequate concepts for the challenges. This includes a clear emphasis on peace and security issues. Only after decades has the conclusion that peace, security are prerequisites for development become prevalent in the DC as well, or, in the famous words of Willy Brandt, "without peace, all is in vain". Considering the challenges on the continent such as violent conflicts and the collapse of states, a strict separation of development, foreign and security policy cannot be maintained and could even prove to be counter-productive. Because of different traditions and the logics of these policies, the conceptual implementation of this conclusion will be difficult. The EU has only just started at this point.

Furthermore, the continuity in fostering human rights, democracy and good governance could be seen positively and as an expression of the EU self-conception as a so-called community of values. Additionally, the high financial commitments are listed with concrete figures. The degree of EU self-commitment has increased with the inclusion of concrete financial commitments; however, they are no more than declarations.

The EU Strategy for Africa can be seen not as the end but the beginning of a process of redefining the EU's policies towards Africa. From this perspective, the EU Africa Strategy marks the beginning of a process to achieve greater coherence, to tackle the main challenges and to increase the efficiency of the EU Africa policy. In the future, this would require the definition of European interests that also needs a prior analysis of the current political and economic developments on the continent. In this case, the Commission's proposal, the parliaments' considerations, and the "European Consensus" are important. In this light, the

more substantial and analytical Commission proposal could be seen as a kind of background paper for the current or for a more elaborate strategy and offer suggestions for a consistent strategy that can be implemented. This scenario, however, requires a certain degree of congruence of interests among the mem-

ber states that surpasses the lowest common denominator and requires the joint wish of the member states to create an EU Africa Strategy.

It remains to be seen, to what extent the German Council presidency in 2007 will contribute to a further development of the EU Africa Strategy.

Endnotes

- 1 Council of the European Union: The EU and Africa: Towards a strategic partnership, Brussels Dec. 19, 2005, described as Africa Strategy in the following.
- 2 Commission of the European Communities: Commission communication to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee: EU strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development. Brussels, Oct. 12, 2005 KOM (2005) 489 final version; described in the following as Commission proposal.
- 3 Cf. also on the development process: Sven Grimm/Nina Kielwein: Die Afrikastrategie der Europäischen Union – Kohärenz gegenüber einem vielschichtigen Kontinent im Wandel, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). Briefing Paper 9/2005.
- 4 In the broadest sense, the EU Africa Dialogue and the joint declaration of the first EU Africa Summit meeting in Cairo in 2000 can also be seen as one of the key documents. The declaration and the Plan for Action that was adopted at the same time remained without visible effects and can be considered as a kind of framework document.
- 5 Cf. on the meaning of the strategy and its connection to military and civil elements of security policy: FES/terre des hommes/Weed (eds.): Civilian perspective or security strategy, Conference Report, Berlin 2005
- 6 Commission of the European Communities: Proposal for a joint declaration by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the EU development policy: "The European Consensus", Brussels July 13, 2005, COM (2005) 311 final version.
- 7 Recently, much attention has been paid to resource- or mineral rich countries. Whereas in some African countries resource richness seems to be a "curse" since it undermines stability (e.g. DR Congo), other countries have established functioning polities (e.g. Botswana). For the discussion, see Dauberstadt, Michael/Schildberg, Arne (eds.), 2006: Dead Ends of Transition. Rentier Economies and Protectorates, Frankfurt a.M./New York: Campus
- 8 European Parliament/Committee on Development: Report on a development strategy for Africa, 27.10.2005, Final A6-0318/2005
- 9 The EP Committee on International Trade calls in the statement mentioned above for elimination of all forms of export subsidies and opening of markets (Oct. 12, 2005).
- 10 Since 1996, France has been financing an extensive programme entitled RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix) to strengthen African capacities. In 2001, Britain extended the programmes for Anglophone countries dating back to the 1970s. The main target is to provide training for up to 20.000 African troops. See also Fernanda Faria: Crisis Management in sub-Saharan Africa: the role of the EU, Paris, ISS Occasional Paper no. 51/2004; <http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ51.pdf>.
- 11 Common Foreign and Security Policy.
- 12 European Security and Defence Policy.
- 13 The 14 planned EU Battle Groups are multi-national units, each consisting of 1500 soldiers, that can be deployed within 15 days for acute crisis intervention for a maximum of 4 months.
- 14 Cf. the overview: Siegmund Schmidt: Demokratie- und Menschenrechtspolitik der Europäischen Union, in: Ferdowski, Mir A. (ed.): Afrika - ein verlorener Kontinent? Munich 2004, pp. 265-292.
- 15 Siegmund Schmidt: Vor dem Rollentausch. Osterweiterung und Entwicklungspolitik, in: Osteuropa: Die Einigung Europas. Zugkraft und Kraftakt, 54, Heft 5/6, Mai-Juni 2004, pp. 460-472
- 16 See Sebastian Wadle/Corinna Schukraft: Die Peace Facility for Africa – Europas Antwort auf die Krisen in Afrika? in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 4/2005, pp. 99-119 and Siegmund Schmidt/Keith Gottschalk: The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development – strong institutions for weak states? in: International Politics and Society (Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft (IPG), (4) 2004, pp. 138-158
- 17 China's increased presence in Africa would also have to be taken into account. The economically motivated interests (resources, trade relations) and the politically motivated interest (Taiwan question) in Africa are a challenge for the EU and the US as well, since China does not adhere to the minimal consensus of the donor states concerning human rights, democracy and good governance.



Attentive listener to the introductory session: Prof. Dr. Herta Däubler-Gmelin, MP

A. The Strategy's Surplus Value

In the center of the debate were doubts about the actual surplus value of the EU Africa Strategy. Critics felt that it raised many subjects, like ownership, but did not really define them, and that repeated promises - for example to continue support to Africa or the new emphasis on peace and security - cannot already be counted as achievements. It was questioned whether the Strategy constituted a qualitative leap compared to earlier processes.

Professor Schmidt's view was that the fact of having a strategy was already the first step forward. The Strategy as a reference document containing some concrete commitments lays the groundwork for further action, since, he noted, it was meant to be an ongoing process up to 2015. He underlined that such a Strategy could not be taken for granted bearing in mind that Europe has only limited economic interests in Africa and that the continent competes with other

regions in the world for attention and resources. Prof. Schmidt concluded that even symbolic politics is not ineffective. His advice to NGOs was to observe carefully the distribution of finances and to examine the coherence between the Barcelona Process, the New Neighborhood Strategy, the Cotonou Agreement and the Africa Strategy.

A. Effective increase of funds in question

The question was also asked what funds will be at the basis of the nascent African security architecture. Professor Schmidt said the African Peace Facility (250 million euros) is mainly financed from the European Development Fund (EDF). He saw the amount as a relatively small basis to operate on, compared for example to the costs of the Burundi Mission, which amount to 123 million euros; but an increase in funds was expected. Thorsten Moritz remarked that it has to be examined very carefully whether this increase in funds is no more than

creative bookkeeping – i.e. with projects already receiving funding merely being relabeled development aid, instead more money actually being made available.

A. NEPAD – Pressing for political reforms?

Another question concerned the future role of NEPAD and the effects of the African Peer Review Mechanism. Prof. Schmidt underlined that NEPAD could be an instrument to press for political reforms, but this depends strongly on what use the Europeans as well as the Africans make of NEPAD. Concerning the Peer Review Mechanism, Schmidt saw the reports on the performance of the countries as the decisive element. The role of civil

society and its inclusion in the Strategy was also discussed. Professor Schmidt remarked that civil society is not explicitly mentioned in the Strategy, apart from its emphasis on democracy.

A. Minimal consensus is a basis - but not one sufficient for a sound policy

The last question dealt with a comparison of the EU Africa Strategy to the EU Commission Paper that prepared the Strategy. Because of the heterogeneous interests of the member states, the Strategy has become a minimal consensus, Professor Schmidt stated. He regarded this compromise as a basis, but not one sufficient for a sound policy towards Africa.

II. Between prevention, sanction and intervention – Cooperation in security policy between EU and Africa

1. EU Support to Africa in the Field of Security: Darfur as a Test Case

Christian Manahl

The EU Africa Strategy, which was adopted by the Council in December 2005, is distinct from previous policy documents and conventions in two regards: It is comprehensive insofar as it combines security, development, trade and migration, and because it addresses Africa as a whole. The Africa Strategy therefore marks a turning point in the EU policy, which had earlier been 'compartmentalised' both in a geographical and a thematic sense.

The most important framework ruling the relations between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa have been the Cotonou Convention and its predecessors. The Cotonou Convention is a development partnership, although it does include political aspects. But it covers only the part of Africa south of the Sahara and also territories in the Pacific and the Caribbean. A whole set of institutional structures, the 'ACP institutions', has been built around this agreement. By contrast, relations with North Africa have been ruled by the Barcelona Process and its institutions.

While there is a certain logic in dealing with Europe's Mediterranean neighbours in one single group, and addressing the development challenges of the sub-Saharan regions of Africa together with those of other regions with similar characteristics, there is also merit in looking at Africa as a whole. This is particularly true when it comes to issues such as security - including the growing challenge related to militant Islamist groups - and migration. Radical Muslims have found a fertile ground for

spreading their message and for finding new recruits in the impoverished masses of Sahelian countries and Eastern Africa, and desperate migrants from sub-Saharan Africa use the easily accessible North African countries as a gateway to Europe. The EU Africa Strategy takes account of these new challenges, which call for a comprehensive and geographically inclusive approach to Africa.

The core idea relating to security in the EU Africa Strategy is African ownership

As regards the specifically security related aspects of the Strategy, it is less innovative. It lists, in fact, a series of principles and strategic elements that have emerged in the political thinking and practice of the last couple of years. The core idea is 'African ownership'. It finds its practical expression in the central role attributed to African (political) leadership in conflict management and conflict resolution, and to the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organisations in the operational implementation of peace-building activities.

The concept of African ownership has become so common that hardly anybody using it finds it necessary to define it and, in particular, to explain how it relates to one of the other principles spelled out in the Strategy: the concept of partnership. It should also be noted, in passing, that African ownership is a relatively new idea that has replaced the dominant concepts of the past decade: conflict prevention and early warning. In the light of events in the D.R. Congo, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire, and



Christian Manahl analyzes the security cooperation between the EU and Africa

Darfur, it would be difficult to argue that these concepts have been particularly successful. To analyze this relative failure of concepts with an unchallenged inherent logic, and their replacement by a concept with much less obvious merits, would deserve some academic and political attention.

I do not intend, however, to tackle this complex shift of paradigms in my short exposé. Neither is it my intention to attempt an exhaustive definition of 'African ownership'. I shall rather demonstrate the practical implementation of this concept, as well as related ones from the Strategy, in the case of Darfur, and conclude with the observation that this experience obliges us to rethink this concept in the broader context of the existing - and evolving - international security architecture.

In Darfur, the AU had its monitors on the ground remarkably quickly

Darfur has been a show-case for the main security-related ideas of the Africa Strategy. In April 2004, when the Government of the Sudan and the rebel movements - the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) - signed a Humanitarian Cease-Fire Agreement, the world had not yet dis-

covered the magnitude of the humanitarian and human rights disaster in Darfur, and was not ready for serious engagement by the United Nations, as the rebels had requested. Only the African Union was ready to deploy the monitoring mechanism referred to (but not defined in detail) in the N'djamena Agreement of 8th April 2004. The AU was swift putting its intention into practice and thus to live up to the ambitions expressed in the Charter of the recently founded organisation, which had replaced the OAU: In May, the AU invited international partners - notably the EU and the US - to a fact-finding mission, and before the end of that month, the modalities of the monitoring mechanism were negotiated in Addis Ababa and defined in a separate agreement signed by the Sudanese parties and the AU. Less than two weeks later, the Force Commander hoisted the AU flag in the future headquarters of the mission in El-Fashir, surrounded by a small group of observers from various African countries. This was a remarkably swift deployment, for which the AU deserves respect and recognition. Hardly any other organisation would have managed to be on the ground in such a short time.

Over the following year and a half, the mission grew from a small ob-

server group of 150 (party representatives included) to a 7,000-strong peace support operation. This was driven by international pressure, following the late discovery of the scope and gravity of the Darfur crisis. The expansion of AMIS (African Mission in Sudan), as the mission has come to be known, had been fast and furious. This inevitably led to major shortcomings, which were identified in two Joint Assessment Missions led by the AU. Not all of the deficiencies were addressed, however, for reasons mainly related to the AU's lack of experience and expertise, but also to occasional disagreements between the Force Commander and the ad hoc strategic headquarters - the 'Darfur Integrated Task Force' (DITF) - that had in the meantime been established in Addis Ababa.

By the end of 2005, it was clear that the parties were either not willing or not able to respect the cease-fire, or incapable of controlling the forces presumably under their control. A reinforced international presence was deemed necessary - probably for a couple of years - in order to address the main and persisting security challenge in Darfur: insecurity for civilians. The AU mission, combined with international pressure, had contributed to a stabilisation of the military situation and to improved access for humanitarian agencies, and it had thus addressed the 'mandate' contained in the N'djamena agreement. However, escalating banditry, inter-ethnic violence, the progressive fragmentation of the rebel groups, and the lack of Government commitment to rein in the militias called Janjaweed, created permanent insecurity for the civilian population outside the camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Unless and until this challenge of civilian security is addressed, a safe and durable return of the IDPs and refugees, which count more than two million, will not be possible.

The recognition of this situation led the AU and its international partners to the 'blue-hatting' decision, i.e. the decision to transfer responsibilities of the AMIS to the UN. In view of the continuing opposition of Khartoum against the 'blue-hatting', this process is still uncertain.

What lessons for the principles in the EU Africa Strategy can we draw from Darfur?

Let me come back to the concepts of African ownership and partnership enshrined in the Africa Strategy. As to the elements of African ownership of AMIS, the bulk of its troops and mission personnel comes from Africa; the mission runs under AU auspices; it has an African Head of Mission (AU Special Envoy) and an African Force Commander; and the AU also has the lead in political negotiations between the Sudanese government and the rebels, the Abuja talks. As to the partnership elements, from its beginnings in May 2004, the EU, the US and Canada enthusiastically supported the AU and provided generous financial, material and logistic assistance, and even personnel for the AU mission. AMIS also includes a small number - less than a hundred - of military observers, staff officers and policemen from the EU, the US and Canada.

It would be erroneous to talk about the international community in a broader sense, because neither China - the biggest shareholder in Sudan's oil industry - nor the Arab world took any initiative or provided any assistance of importance regarding Darfur. Their interests converged on their common concern for the stability of the regime. It was up to the 'West' to prevent the Darfuri IDPs from starving to death and to afford them minimum security against the relentless attacks of the Janjaweed.

The partnership between the AU and its 'Western' donors has not been smooth sailing. It was a difficult learning process for both sides. During the second half of 2004, the AU passed a critical threshold: By deciding to replace the small and easily manageable observer group with a large, 3,200 strong peace support mission whose mandate included (limited) protection of civilians, it took a daring decision, without being prepared for this in terms of institutional structures, expertise or experience. In short, it amounted to launching a UN-style operation without having a UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO).

Too much advice fell on deaf ears

The donors of AMIS rushed to the AU's rescue by offering dozens of military advisors, while there were hardly any African experts in Addis Ababa to receive such advice. What followed was a bumpy and at times acrimonious relationship, in which European and American experts grew increasingly impatient with the deficiencies of AMIS, notably at the strategic level (in El-Fashir, Khartoum and Addis Ababa), and frustrated by the reluctance of the AU to implement the recommendations of two Joint Assessment Missions (in March and December 2005). The AU officials African top commanders, for their part, were often unhappy, if not irritated by the apparently unwanted advice of foreign experts.

In spite of these difficulties, there was an unbroken commitment to the concepts of African ownership and the AU-EU partnership at the highest political level. It functioned reasonably well at the field level of the observer teams and among the soldiers and officers in the sectors in Darfur. But in the area most critical to the success of the mission - the command and control level - the partnership proved to be much more difficult and problematic.

The inability of AMIS to address the previously mentioned challenge of civilian security has led to growing criticism by some international NGOs and think tanks, as well as in the press. Contrary to some particularly severe judgements, which termed AMIS a failure, the view held within the EU institutions has been that the mission was a relative success: Combined with the international pressure on the belligerents, it has had a critical impact on the security situation in Darfur; it stopped the unbridled campaign of ethnic cleansing that had ravaged much of Darfur in the first couple of months of 2004; and it enabled humanitarian agencies to gain access to most of the IDPs.

Nevertheless, the AU is currently not in a position to mount the more robust response to the current and future challenges in Darfur. And international donors are neither willing nor able to finance a large peace-support mission

for an extended period of time from exclusively voluntary contributions, as has been the case with AMIS.

Partnership must include shared decision-making and long-term commitment

This recognition, together with the lessons learnt from the EU-AU partnership experience, implies a re-thinking of the basic concepts of the Africa Strategy. As this re-thinking is in its initial stages, I will only outline three ideas relevant to this process:

First, we need to realize that the concept of partnership implies co-responsibility. If we are in a partnership with the AU in Darfur, then it is not the AU alone which fails or succeeds - in the words of AU Special Envoy Kingibe: "we are sitting in the same boat, we succeed or fail together". What is particularly problematic in this context are unilateral decisions of either side, such as the AU decision for a rapid expansion of AMIS from May to September against the explicit advice of the EU. In the event, this precipitate expansion almost paralysed the mission in September 2005. We need to qualify our commitment so as not to become co-responsible for failures owed to decisions on which we have little influence. Conversely, the AU requires a substantial medium-term commitment from its international partners in order to conduct meaningful planning.

Second, the AU itself, but also its international partners, need to define and agree which role the organisation can play in conflict management and peacebuilding. Obviously, the AU is not a panacea to all problems of Africa, and Darfur has clearly shown the limits of the AU's current operational capacity. The AU may well evolve in the future into an organisation capable of deploying and sustaining big peace-support operations, and donors may agree to establish funding mechanisms to support such missions over an extended period of time. But currently, the AU is neither capable of sustaining large and complex missions for a long time, nor are donors prepared to pay for them. Hence, the

AU's role needs to be redefined within a global security architecture, where other players, notably the UN, but also sub-regional organisations, have a role to play.

Third, the international community should give some thought to the operationalization of the concept of the 'responsibility to protect'. Little thinking has been done about a level or threshold that would trigger an international response, or about which degree of protection potential victims of political, ethnic or religious violence are entitled to. In more blunt terms: Is the limited protection of IDP camps, provided by AMIS in Darfur, enough? Is the international

community obliged to do more, and by which means? And what about capacities? The spill-over of the Darfur conflict into Chad, or the risk of an expansion into other areas of the Sudan, should give us enough reason to think carefully about these questions.

The ongoing debate about the 'blue-hatting' of AMIS, and the expected transfer of responsibilities from the AU to AMIS offers a good opportunity to all involved - the AU, the UN, and the donors of AMIS - to analyse the AU intervention in Darfur and to discuss perspectives and principles for future cooperation.

2. What is Required for Security and Crisis Prevention in Africa? An African Perspective

Jeffery Isima

The EU-Africa Strategy is no doubt a comprehensive strategy aimed at supporting Africa to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Strategy rightly recognises the significance of peace and security (and good governance) as prerequisites for attaining the goals outlined in the Strategy document. This demonstrates a good understanding of one of the fundamental problems hindering development in several African countries. While the number of countries involved in armed conflict in Africa has been declining steadily in recent years, many of the post-conflict states are still quite fragile and are susceptible to further armed conflict. The document acknowledges this and has therefore articulated a strategy that will ensure EU involvement in the conflict cycle from 'conflict prevention, via conflict management to conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction'.

This presupposes dealing with the root causes of conflict and supporting various efforts of the African Union (AU), especially its nascent peace and security architecture. The AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which form the pillar on which the AU's strength is built, are the means through which the EU intends to channel most of its support, although under its principle of 'subsidiarity' national governments will also be supported.

EU relations with Africa date back to the series of the Lomé I Agreements, which started in 1975. However, these agreements were within the framework of the African, Caribbean and Pacific

(ACP) Countries initiative and dealt essentially with issues of trade and aid. Conflict prevention began to creep into EU-Africa relations from the mid-1990s with bilateral assistance from European countries in military training and peace support operations (PSOs). The Cotonou Agreement of 2000, which was reviewed in 2005, marked the first formal agreement also dealing with peace and security issues. In 2002, EU supported the transitional justice initiative in Rwanda. A watershed in EU assistance in the region occurred in 2003 when it launched a peacekeeping operation, 'Operation Artemis', in Bunia, a town in the Ituri region of the D.R. Congo. In 2004, the EU's African Peace Facility (APF) was launched to support the AU (and the RECs) in conflict prevention. Totalling €250 million, the fund was meant mainly for peacekeeping and secondarily for building African capacity for PSOs.

Thus the EU peace and security policy in Africa until this time was pursued in two directions: building African capacity for PSOs and building the EU's capabilities for short-term intervention in conflicts in the continent. Yet, these interventions were based on broader EU-ACP relations, while EU policy towards Africa remained fragmented as special agreements were made with different countries. For instance, the EU has a special engagement with South Africa through the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), while the Maghreb countries have separate arrangements with the EU through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership - since 2004 the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The aim of this contribution is to examine the peace and security component of the EU Strategy document against the background of the emerging AU security architecture and the security situation in Africa as a whole. The objective is to examine the extent to which the Strategy constitutes new efforts to tackle identified security problems in Africa and the extent to which it can actually address some of the key security problems on the continent.

The EU-Africa Strategy for Peace and Security: What is new?

The EU-Africa Strategy is of crucial importance for several reasons: it represents the first single policy document that provides an overall guideline for EU engagement and policy implementation in Africa; it has strong political status since it was approved at the highest level by the European Council; and it attempts to address the root causes of conflict, the structural causes of crisis, in Africa. With respect to conflict prevention, the Strategy envisages:

- A comprehensive approach to conflict prevention with integrated policies in the fields of security, development and democratic governance. These will include supporting national and regional strategies that address the root causes of conflict and supporting national and regional early warning systems.
- Support for African-led PSO through the strengthening and replenishment of the EU Peace Facility for Africa.
- Support for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) of former fighters in conflict states with a coordinated approach.
- Support for post conflict states through sustained and flexible policies and support for security sector reform (SSR).
- Tackling conflict resources, for example by supporting the Kimberly process.

While the Strategy appears to be comprehensive and supportive of national, regional and continental policies on peace and security, there are questions as

to how it will be implemented in practical terms. A number of these questions, considered as very pertinent, are discussed below.

Additional money will be needed. Will it be taken from development aid?

Question number one is about financing the Strategy. There are two critical problems currently plaguing the peace and security programmes of the AU and the activities of the RECs: lack of funds and absence of the requisite capacity to execute some of the designed programmes. The EU Strategy relies considerably on the APF, which has supported the new AU security architecture well, especially with the funding of the operation in the Sudan. However the €250 million earmarked for the facility from the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) is now exhausted. The next source of funds for the facility is likely to be the next EDF, but this is not assured. Yet what the AU and the RECs need to execute their programmes is a reliable source of income to support the contributions from their members. In the absence of assured funding, planning becomes haphazard and the burden of sponsorship is shifted to overburdened regional powers (mainly Nigeria and South Africa). This is hardly the best way to maintain peace and security in a fragile environment.

Another problem regarding funding relates to the source and type of money for the peace facility. While the APF was no doubt a new and welcome development, the money provided for the facility was not new money. Rather it was pooled together by 'shaving off' a percentage of what was, in the EDF, due to be used for other purposes in African countries. This raises the question about the issue of increasing aid to Africa and the quest of EU member states (especially the oldest 15 members) to meet the target of raising official development aid (ODA) to 0.7 percent of GDP by 2015. Will the new aid be additional or will it be renamed "development aid" in order to meet the UN benchmark?



Giving an African perspective on peacekeeping and crisis prevention: Jeffrey Isima

Some donors want spending on peace and security to be counted as development aid

This is particularly important since until recently donor spending on peace and security in developing countries was not counted as development assistance. But there is an on-going debate within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), to which most EU members belong, on this issue. Some donor countries want current spending on certain security related assistance to be counted as ODA, others oppose this. The EU Strategy paper does not say anything on this question, but given that the APF derived its source of financing from already earmarked ODA funds, it will not be surprising if in the future the bulk of what will be counted as increased aid to Africa is actually made up of money already being spent in these countries for security purposes. Alternatively, the focus on peace and security might end up reducing overall aid and in particular the amount of assistance that goes into the social and economic sectors in poor countries. If this were to happen then the cause of development, for which peace and security are seen as prerequisites, would have been inadvertently defeated.

A related issue which has enormous implications for African states is milita-

ry spending. A number of donors regard relatively high military spending in African countries as wasteful expenditure and therefore either withhold aid from countries accused of such practices, or cut aid for them completely. How is the current EU Strategy going to affect this approach to military spending? Donors have often linked a low level of military spending in poor states to eligibility for economic assistance. Yet emerging evidence suggests that a number of African states actually need to reform their militaries in order to enable them to tackle the myriad security problems plaguing their countries. Reforms are also needed to bring armies up to the standard for participation in the regional brigades that are supposed to form the bedrock of the African standby force, which is a major component of the emerging African security architecture. While the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD has already suggested that donors should refrain from imposing spending ceilings on military expenditure in recipient states, this is far from being heeded. The EU Strategy document is silent on this issue. Yet well-funded national armies, well-equipped by local standards, will go a long way in fending off a number of security issues that are the main concerns of the EU in Africa.

African civil society should be consulted more while constructing a security architecture

Question number two is about African contributions in designing the Strategy. The EU consulted both the RECs and the AU. The peace and security programmes of these organisations, especially the AU's nascent peace and security architecture, were taken into consideration. However, a number of RECs and the AU did not involve Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the process of designing their programmes, nor did they give them the opportunity to make any input into the governance of security on the continent. It is therefore doubtful to what extent the EU Strategy reflects the wishes of the people of Africa. Given that a major weakness of the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was its perceived distance from the African people and its lack of people-centred programmes, the AU is attempting to reach out to CSOs on the continent working in the area of peace and security. With Danish support, it started in 2005 a series of consultations with African CSOs on the emerging security architecture. The first of the meetings, held in August 2005, was quite revealing: A number of the CSOs felt some of the issues that were meant to be addressed, such as early warning, are better left to CSOs that are close to the sources of conflict and that could better advise on brewing conflicts than distant organisations can. The AU-CSO consultations are continuing, and only when they have been completed can a credible security architecture be said to have evolved with proper consultation with the people.

Question number three is: Will EU member states have the political will to act in conformity with the spirit of the EU Strategy? This is required for the Strategy's implementation. However, EU member states may not be willing to agree on the details of common foreign policy because of their national interests. Recent cases of division within the EU over the invasion of Iraq and over sanctions on Zimbabwe reveal the tendency of members to act outside the union when it suits their interests.

Question number four concerns policy coherence: Can the EU Strategy be implemented in a coherent manner, given internal conflict among EU institutions? The Strategy fails to state how the process of engagement will be overseen and coordinated. There is a history of disguising the actual level of delivery on aid promises by European countries, and the European Commission is reluctant to criticise its members directly.

Capacity building for parliaments is needed for the long-term success of an African security architecture

Capacity Building is the issue of question number five. Current efforts seem to be geared towards peacekeeping alone, even though other activities such as DDDR and SSR are mentioned in the Strategy paper. But there is a need to move away from peacekeeping to other areas of support such as capacity building in the legislative and regulatory institutions like national parliaments and the peace and security departments of RECs and the AU. These institutions are critical to the long-term sustenance of the emerging security architecture in Africa. A strong parliamentary committee on defence or security for instance will be able to challenge some of the excesses for which African security forces are known.

Concern number six: Africa has dwindled in terms of strategic importance. Conflicts in the continent are only given international attention when crises erupt, rather than striving for a conflict prevention approach which addresses the structural causes of crises.

(1) Question number seven relates to poor governance. The document does not mention sanctions on erring African states, but places much faith in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to reign in such states. The case of Zimbabwe shows that this optimism needs to be treated with caution and that civil society needs to be involved in addressing issues of structural violence and poor governance in Africa. The EU imposed some sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2003, invoking the Cotonou Agreement, but did not follow the procedure of prior consul-

tation stipulated in the agreement. This weakened the credibility of the sanction; African leaders rallied to the support of President Mugabe. This shows that any consensus between the EU and Africa on governance issues is fragile.

Question number eight is about the debt burden of African countries. No mention of debt relief is made, apart from the commitment to the HIPC (highly indebted poor countries) initiative. Besides HIPC, not many countries were covered by the 2005 G8 debt deal. The debt burden is a source of structural violence and insecurity in Africa, and cannot be divorced from conflict prevention in the region.

Finally, the EU document is emphatic about the principle of African ownership. But with regards to security, do African institutions possess the capacity and expertise to own programmes? And to what extent is the principle of ownership mainstreamed across the EU's security architecture and policy instruments towards Africa, such as SSR and DDDR?

What is needed for African security and conflict prevention

Proper consultation with the people through CSOs is crucial, particularly at the stage of developing the action plan for the implementation of the EU Strate-

gy. There is also a need to support armed forces in African states through training and appropriate equipment. This includes removing the ceilings on spending for the military and instead focussing on the process by which the states arrive at the level of spending. Increased financial support to the RECs and the AU and the extension of that support from peacekeeping to other critical aspects of African security, including capacity building at both the national and continental levels, are called for. Also very crucial is the injection of new money into the financing of security in Africa instead of shaving off already committed money from ODA budgets.

Furthermore, there is a need for greater policy coordination within the EU on what constitutes development assistance and security assistance. This would require the deployment of a full range of policy instruments such as political dialogue and the use of envoys, which are part of the instruments of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. In addition, conflict prevention should be mainstreamed across all instruments of assistance, rather than being seen as a specific activity. Finally, multinational corporations operating in Africa should be factored in when addressing conflict goods that feed the cycle of internal conflict and violence in the region.

3. The EU Strategy for Africa: Questions Raised for EU Development Policy

Olive Towey

On 16 December 2005, the European Council adopted "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership". The seven-page document sets out "the steps the European Union will take with Africa between now and 2015 to support African efforts to build...a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future for all (its peoples)". The intention of this Strategy is to provide a single reference point both for the European Commission and the 25 EU member states in their cooperation with Africa. In a communication to the European Council and the Parliament from October 2005, the European Commission presents the Strategy as a response to the challenge of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa and to recent political and institutional change at European and African level.¹ The short document however provokes many questions as to the nature, status, scope and consequences of the new European Strategy for Africa.

The year which drew to a close with agreement on this Strategy was remarkable in terms of public and policy focus on overseas development. At international level, the convergence of the G8, the UN World Summit and the WTO negotiations provided a framework for the Global Campaign for Action Against Poverty (GCAP) and a policy agenda focussed on issues of aid, trade and debt. The UK Presidency of the EU in the latter part of 2005 had a particular focus on Africa, with the Commission on Africa setting the continent at the heart of its reflections on the global development challenge.

At EU level, in a year of internal dissonance on many issues, 2005 paradoxically saw strong and united support from in the area of overseas development. The EU commitments agreed at the Meeting of the European Council in June, in advance of the UN World Summit in September, are worthy of particular note.² For both the Commission and the Member States, 2006 and the years to come are about living up to and going beyond the promises made in 2005. Commitments on quantity and quality of ODA must be monitored and made real. The political will necessary to deliver on the MDGs must be sustained and strengthened. The European Strategy for Africa has potentially an important role to play in supporting and reinforcing each of these objectives. But we need to question, clarify and better understand its exact nature. For me it raises a number of questions.

The Strategy for Africa must be read together with other EU documents

The primary aims of the new EU Strategy for Africa are cited as "the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the promotion of sustainable development, security and good governance in Africa". It is said to be based on the principles of "partnership, equality and mutual accountability"; its underlying philosophy speaks of "African ownership and responsibility", including "working through African institutions". Before accepting these assertions, it is important to note that this Council document is not the single point of departure but one of a wider set of documents which together



Olive Towey puts the EU Africa Strategy into the context of the overall EU development policy

comprise the new Strategy. The elements of this Strategy each have their own political orientation and policy priorities.

In the follow-up to the December Council conclusions, the Commission and Council Secretariat began to work on implementation and cited four reference documents to be considered alongside the Council document. Among these are the communication of the Commission from October 2005, mentioned above, and a paper by Javier Solana from the same month. The latter concerns the peace and security aspects of the Strategy for Africa and the contribution that the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) can make. All five inputs must work in tandem, so the challenges of reconciliation and coordination emerge. How will this process be shaped, and who will be involved in 'next steps'?

Existing Regional Agreements between Europe and Africa will remain. It is important to recognise that the new Strategy does not replace the Cotonou Agreement, which provides a framework for the relationship between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership with Northern African countries, since 2004 the European Neighbourhood Policy, will also continue to operate on the basis of its current framework, objectives and funding mechanisms.

Therefore the question which follows is exactly what impact the Strategy for Africa will have on these current agreements? What influence might it have, for example, on the next generation of Country Strategy Papers? Conversely, how will the principle of partnership enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement find expression in the new Strategy for Africa? These are just some of a myriad of issues to be debated.

How does the Africa Strategy relate to the Consensus on Development?

In terms of Europe's development policy, it is worth considering the new Strategy alongside the "European Consensus on Development", which was signed by the Parliament, the Council and the Commission in July 2005. While the latter has as its overarching objectives poverty eradication, sustainable development and achievement of the MDGs, the Strategy for Africa goes far beyond the development agenda and is a reflection of broader European foreign policy priorities. As with the regional agreements, the question is: How will each of these policy frameworks influence the other? How will the principles of ownership, partnership and gender equality in the "European Consensus" be reflected in the Africa Strategy? And how will the issues of governance and security addressed in the Strategy reflect themselves in the dis-

cussions on the implementation of aid? These questions are particularly important as they relate to the centrality of development in Europe's wider engagement with Africa.

Dissonance in the institutional organisation of the Commission presents further challenges to the successful implementation of the Strategy. In terms of development cooperation, the Directorate-General Development (DG DEV) deals with sub-Saharan Africa while the Directorate-General Foreign Relations (DG RELEX) deals with Northern Africa. The precise division of responsibilities between these two DGs is not always clear. Two financial frameworks – the European Development Fund (EDF) for ACP countries and the Financial Perspectives – dictate according to different frameworks, timelines and geographies how much money is allocated where and for what. An obvious question is exactly how the Strategy for Africa is to be funded and what impact this will have on allocations under the EDF and the new instruments under the Financial Perspectives.

A clear division of labour between the European Commission and member states is needed

The Strategy applies to member states also and so necessitates a clearly agreed division of labour both between the Commission and the member states and across Member States. While the Paris Declaration on Harmonisation and Alignment (March 2005) does move things in the right direction, significant barriers remain.

The above are some of areas of dissonance which will influence and perhaps be influenced by the implementation of the European Strategy for Africa. Against this background, the more general question can be asked: As it “percolates” through the existing structures, what form will this new Strategy take? Will it provide some opportunity for greater alignment and harmonisation? Will it add value to Europe's engagements with Africa? Will it make a difference to the effectiveness of the EU's poverty reduction policies? Certainly this is its aim and we must hope that it is successful.

Another very crucial point is that the European Strategy for Africa is not a Europe-Africa Strategy. It has been discussed at EU level principally and agreed by the European Council. There is an ambition on the part of the EU to “transform” it into a “joint” strategy. However, it is not (yet) a joint strategy, it is a European plan for Africa. African partnership and African ownership of any “joint” strategy can only come about through a process of committed consultation – not only with governments but, if it is to have any credibility, with civil society too.

Civil society, both in Europe and Africa, should engage in the implementation of the Strategy

This process of consultation has not yet begun, and obvious questions include whether the Strategy can be aligned with AU/NEPAD priorities and if so, how? What will be the process that makes this alignment possible? How is African civil society to be consulted and how inclusive will this process be?

Overarching these and other detailed questions is a more fundamental one: Will this Strategy be progressed towards its stated objectives in a manner true to its stated principles (partnership, equality and mutual accountability) and its stated philosophy (African ownership and responsibility including working through African institutions)? It may be too early to tell.

I began by suggesting we need to question, clarify and better understand the exact nature of this new Strategy. The above questions give us some basis for this. As the institutions move forward with implementation, our debate amongst broader constituencies should continue. We need – in Europe and in Africa – to engage with, to be engaged with and to become part of the “next steps” as this European Strategy for Africa moves from rhetoric to reality.

Endnotes

¹ http://www.delnga.cec.eu.int/eu_and_country/eu_strategy_for_africa_12_10_2005_en.pdf

² http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_4929_en.htm

4. Discussion Panel 1

Between Prevention, Sanction and Intervention – Security Policy cooperation between the EU and Africa

The EU's interests in Africa

The discussion first centred on how an interest could be organised on the part of EU member states to engage over the long term in crises in Africa. Jeffrey Isima put forward the following thesis: If Africa was of strategic importance, then the EU would come up with strategic resources and strategic time for long-term attention and involvement there. It is therefore necessary to clarify the strategic importance of Africa to the rest of the world as well as to the key players in the global system.

Christian Manahl emphasised that the Africa Strategy is not a joint EU-Africa strategy but one elaborated by the EU. Therefore he would have wished it to give a clearer definition of what the EU's interests in Africa are. His view is that a frank and honest public debate about European interests would result in public support for EU interventions in Africa. As the interest with the greatest public effect Mr. Manahl identified the issue of migration; he also mentioned other issues like drug trafficking or terrorism. These interests should be publicly debated in order to create public approval for EU involvement in conflicts in Africa. “We cannot sustain the commitment which is expressed in the EU Africa Strategy if we present it only as a human rights matter. The public interest is not strong enough to generate the resources for this. I think we really need a change of public debate here”, Manahl said.

The use and limits of military involvement

One question from the audience was what Africans think about the sea change of European policy from a kind of civilian power to military involvement. Do Africans feel threatened by this? The audience was also very interested in the lessons learned in Darfur concerning the commitment of the EU to engage in conflicts in Africa.

According to Christian Manahl, EU military involvement in Africa will need a good explanation, because sending European soldiers back to Africa is seen as a sensitive issue - historically, Europe has not been politically innocent in Africa. However, many Africans want the AU to be capable of dealing with the problems on the continent. This desire, Manahl said, had a strong influence on the creation of the security element in the new AU, which is supported by the EU. He also told the audience that the involvement of EU personnel in the AU-led mission in Darfur was an idea neither of the EU nor of the AU but of the rebel factions in Darfur. They initially did not trust the AU, and when EU diplomats convinced them that the AU was best placed to lead the mission, the rebels accepted, but insisted on also having European and US personnel on the ground. So in a way the concept enshrined in the Africa Strategy has been invented by the Darfuri rebels, Manahl remarked.

He pointed out that the EU observers on the ground in Darfur had worked together fairly well with their African partners and come back rather



Impression of the lively exchange between audience and panelists

enthusiastic. He also assessed police cooperation as reasonably good. But in the command structure cooperation generally was very difficult because of a strong reluctance on the part of the AU to accept a reasonable role for EU officers. In Manahl's view the AU mission in Darfur (AMIS) was not a failure but a qualified success, although it showed the limits of the AU as a very young institution still building its capacities. He saw a high risk of overstressing these capacities and stated that the best solution would be to hand AMIS over to the UN.

If we see AMIS as a failure, we have to conclude that the EU-Africa Strategy in the field of security has failed as well because it was an implementation of the EU Africa Strategy and its principle of African ownership, Manahl said. He deemed it necessary to re-evaluate the partnership between EU and AU, to clarify the respective roles and to enhance the capacities of the AU. The question should be: What is the AU able to do, what does the AU want the EU to do and what is the UN expected to do?

One risk addressed by the audience was the exclusive focus on the AU in the Africa Strategy. An alternative, complementary approach was proposed: the EU should also work together with regional organizations like SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD and build strategic partnerships with key players

like South Africa, probably Nigeria and some countries in Eastern and Central Africa. On this Mr. Manahl remarked that regional organizations are still under construction and faced with structural difficulties. "That we should not exclusively focus on the AU - yes, I agree. But the regional organizations are not easy partners either. SADC is an obvious case because of the issue of Zimbabwe, but also remember that the IGAD commitment to the peace process in Somalia has caused more confusion than anything else. That doesn't mean we aren't interested in working with regional organizations. But we need a dialogue on exactly what they undertake and how they operate, and we have to weigh very carefully what their vested interests are."

Mr. Goodison expressed doubts that development assistance will be used more effectively, noting that he was worried that Africa's share of EU development assistance was bound to decline. A concern mentioned by Olive Towey was that due to the alliances between security and development, money that has been allocated for development will now be diverted towards security matters.

It was also asked where the funding for the military and security sector comes from. Mr. Manahl replied that the bulk of the EU funds for AMIS came from the African Peace Facility, though a

number of member states had also made bilateral contributions. He explained that anything the EU does in the military and security sector depends on the commitment of the member states, because the Council and EU military staff can only mobilize people for short-term missions.

Role of multinational corporations in economies of conflict

Mr. Isima missed a stronger position in the Africa Strategy on attempts to restrict war economies. He remarked that the Strategy says nothing about the role of multinational corporations as critical actors in economies of conflict, although they trade in conflict goods like diamonds or coltan. He concluded that the involvement of multinational corporations must be observed critically.

Division of labour in Europe – Who is responsible for what?

Mr. Goodison emphasised his worries concerning the division of labour between the EU and its member states in various areas, particularly peace and security. Who is responsible for doing what? Who is setting policy priorities and objectives for missions? Is the commission acting like an additional member state or can it assume a different and special role?

Mr. Manahl agreed that there is a triangle between the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the member states and that there is a lot of internal jockeying for position and insistence on specific competences. But in view of the fact that there is as yet no European constitution and common foreign policy structure, the only possibility is to come to terms with the actual situation and to find ways of working together. In the medium term a decision needs to be taken on whether European military and conflict management structures should be developed and whether the EU should be turned into a political entity that is capable of action in the security around the world. Manahl remarked that EU member states have not yet decided whether they want strong EU military structures apart from what exists in NATO.

Concerning tensions created by the division of labor between the Commission and the member states, Olive Towey pointed to the example of public opinion in Ireland: When things are going well, it is the member state that has made the right choices, but when things are going badly it is the politicians in Brussels who are responsible. This is similar to public perceptions of development policy, she said: "Development is also something out there. So in terms of the division of labor, if there was a greater clarity about the role of the Commission and the Council in development and in security, then there could perhaps be a debate that would bring people on board."

The purpose of the Congo mission

The audience also questioned the usefulness of the Congo mission, with only 400 soldiers on the ground. The impression was that its main motive was to be able to evacuate as many foreigners as possible in case things should go wrong, and that the EU followed specific interests in Congo and therefore wanted to have a sort of control over the elections. Mr. Manahl denied this. He argued that the main EU interest in the Congo is that the elections do not become a political event destabilizing the Congo, i.e. they need to be conducted in as free and fair a manner as possible. "If the number of soldiers says anything about the importance of vested interests in play, than I would say, compared to the several hundred thousands of American troupes in Iraq, a few hundred European soldiers in the Congo testify to a very low level of European interest", he said.

But according to Mr. Manahl, the number of soldiers alone is not the most important question. Equally important is what they do, where they do it, and what the specific impact of their work is on the overall situation. He cited the example of operation ARTEMIS in Ituri (Eastern Congo) in 2003, where a small number of European soldiers had a considerable impact far beyond the geographical area because their intervention helped stabilise the UN mission in Congo. According to Manahl a small number of

people provided with a clearly defined mandate can sometimes tip the balance in a critical situation.

The audience remarked that one challenge the EU is facing is to build up long-term structural stability in the Congo instead of short-term military activism. A Marshall Plan for the Congo was demanded for this reason. On this point Mr. Isima agreed: "Rather than seeing European army deployments in Africa as negative, it is too small - necessary but not sufficient. African conflict zones require a Marshall Plan that brings about transformation of the structural conditions in Africa, an engagement that we saw in the former republic of Yugoslavia." Mr. Isima continued by saying that since the year 2000 European security and military interest has grown in Africa: more deployments, more engagement,

more support for the AU and regional organizations. But he took the view that in terms of the speed of response Africa is marginalized.

China in Africa

A last point brought up in the discussion was China's growing strategic engagement in Africa, for instance as the most important shareholder in the Sudanese oil industry. In a somewhat provocative vein, Mr. Manahl called the engagement of China in Africa a state capitalism spreading investment. He underlined that a political dialogue with China is urgently called for. Although China has not shown much interest in this, a first meeting at which the EU will discuss Africa with the Chinese is planned to take place very soon.

III. Self-interest or fair partnership? Economic and trade relations between the EU and Africa

1. Economic Partnership Agreements May Support Poverty Reduction If They Strengthen our Co-operation with Poor Countries

Alexis Valqui,

**Federal Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development (BMZ)**

If we want to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and in particular to eradicate poverty by 2015, this objective premises an average growth of at least 8 percent per year in Africa. Which preconditions have to be met to realize this growth rate? From our point of view these are two major conditions: On the one hand the investment climate and the framework of production have to be improved in African countries. On the other hand, Africa has to integrate much better and with more emphasis into the world economy to assure that the chances globalisation provides can be used much better. There is a sequence of effects: Trade can have its effects on growth and growth is an important contribution to the fight against poverty and in the end to the achievement of the MDGs.

But trade liberalisation does not automatically lead to an increase in exports, nor does more trade automatically lead to less poverty. What then is the role of trade in a development strategy? The aim cannot be a global and undifferentiated trade liberalisation. Trade liberalisation has to be integrated into a comprehensive development strategy. In many developing countries the preconditions are yet to be established to enable these countries to use and to increase the chances that existing markets provide. In this context statements like 'trade instead of development' are counterproductive. Individual steps towards

trade liberalisation rather have to match the demands of a socially and also ecologically sustainable development in the countries concerned.

EPAs are a tool of trade policy and simultaneously of development policy

An important tool of the EU trade policy cooperation with developing countries in Africa is the so called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that apply to the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. For northern Africa there is a similar partnership (the Euromed partnership) and for South Africa here is the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). Let me clarify here that the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is not responsible for the EPA negotiations, as these are carried out by the European Commission, but the BMZ monitors the EPA process from the German perspective and from a development point of view.

What are the objectives of EPAs? They are a tool of trade policy and simultaneously of development policy. Let me explain this in greater detail. The EPAs are to contribute to the regional integration of the African, of the Caribbean and of the Pacific regions (ACP). What we observe in these regions is that barriers to trade within these regions are partly higher than they are between the North and the South. The EPAs should on the one hand contribute to the improvement of market access of ACP countries to the EU. On the other hand, they should entail a careful liberalization and opening of ACP markets which is asymmetrical but mutual.



Alexis Valqui explains the German government's position on the EPAs

The German government hopes that EPAs will provide an impetus for institutional reforms in ACP countries, for the strengthening of good governance and for an increasing integration of trade aspects in national development strategies. EPAs combine actions in trade policies with a wide range of support from European development cooperation. The latter is meant on the one hand to assist ACP countries in strengthening their production and trade capacity and on the other hand to support their internal reform processes.

The EPA negotiations will be a major topic during Germany's presidency of the EU

Where are we in these processes right now? Regional negotiations between the EU and the ACP countries began in 2003. EPAs are to enter into force in 2008 and a negotiation road map has accordingly been set up. But if the agreements are to be ratified in 2007 to become effective in 2008, the proposals for the texts of future agreements have to be put on the table until the end of this year. In the first half of 2007 Germa-

ny will hold the EU presidency, where EPAs will be a major topic. If we consider EPAs not only as trade agreements but also as a process and a framework for strengthening our economic and political cooperation and our relationship with the ACP countries, then this process may have an important impact on sustainable development and in the end towards the achievement of the MDGs in Africa.

From the point of view of a civil servant in development cooperation, and commenting on the question whether EPAs are characterized by the EU's economic self-interest or by a fair partnership, I have to say that EPAs focus on the partnership aspects, but in the end both objectives count. In respect of a coherent foreign policy, the achievement of meaningful development objectives is in Germany's interest, as it is in Europe's. I am not referring to the EU's economic self-interests but to the objectives of our development policy. So please let me answer the question put to us at the beginning of these discussions with a slight re-phrasing of the question: "To pursue a fair partnership out of self-interest."

2. The EU's Attempt to Introduce Economic Partnership Agreements Quickly is Fraught with Many Problems

Michael Brüntrup, DIE

This contribution postulates two fundamental hypotheses on the main question of this part of the conference: whether the economic and trade relations of the EU with Africa are determined by self-interest or by fair partnership. The two theses are the following:

- In contrast to general declarations which have been made, the EU has no real strategy towards Africa. Instead, there is at best a patchwork of different approaches. These approaches change in the course of time, and sometimes improvements (in the sense of consistency) can lead to aggravation in other areas.
- Therefore, there is no clear answer to this question – both are true, depending on which region, country and which sectors and relationships are being examined.

This is not meant as fundamental criticism of the EU policy towards Africa, since a complete elimination of all contradictions is probably not possible. However, there still is potential for improvements in some areas. The following text analyses the common trade policy that is fundamental to economic relations. Additionally, some related aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that are also community policy within the EU are considered, as well as development policy.

Africa's Relevance for the EU

Trade relations with the EU are of extreme importance to the African con-

tinents. According to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), about 40 % of African exports went to the EU in 2004 (25), and 45% of all imports originated from the EU. The most important African products are energy (fuels) and minerals (51%), manufactured products (34%) and agricultural products (15%). For the EU, on the other hand, economic relations with Africa are rather marginal: Only 2.5% of all exports and 2.5% of all imports.

However, these statistics do not show the enormous differences between the 53 countries on the African continent that are relevant to the economic and trade relations of the EU. First of all in terms of economic capability. In countries such as South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria or Morocco this capability is quite different from that in the large number of small countries that are mostly among the world's poorest. The latter have only a very limited production base and usually have a highly unbalanced export structure, which is often dominated by either mineral or agricultural products.


Other characteristics that are decisive for relations with the EU, such as proximity to Europe and thus especially the pressure for migration from these countries, the importance of goods (especially oil and minerals, which are strategically important) and, recently, the security situation (especially if European security is at stake) – modify the relevance of relations of some countries with the EU.

Main Economic Agreements of the EU with Africa within the Framework of African Regional Integration

The EU and African countries are linked together by a vast number of different economic and trade agreements. The more recent agreements are so-called partnership agreements that regulate the core element of trade relations as well as a large number of other relations

– economic, political, social and cultural. Regional integration has increasingly become both an aim and an instrument at the same time. The diversity between the different countries (see above) and the complexity of the African trade and economic communities are often called a “spaghetti bowl” (Fig. 1) and make any regional approach very difficult. This will be elaborated in more detail below.

Fig.: Regional integration initiatives in Africa



Source: Schiff and Winters (2003)

Three agreements between the EU and African countries or groups of countries are especially relevant:

1. Agreements under the auspices of the so-called Barcelona Process with the Mediterranean countries, including North African states. Absolute poverty in these countries is minimal; distribution problems, however, are often quite serious. The interest of the EU in these countries relates partly to their potential as economic partners, partly they are important for energy and mineral supplies, many are important as countries of origin or transfer for migrants, and nearly all have special relevance for stability and security in Europe. There are individual association agreements with every country – the liberalisation of trade relations is a core element in ev-

ery case. Furthermore, regional trade integration is to be advanced and a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone is to be established by 2010. Until now, however, integration (not only between the African countries) in this region has been rather minimal.

2. South Africa is economically the most relevant African country, accounting for 21% of all EU exports to the continent. At least for Southern Africa, it is politically also the most important. The EU interests are correspondingly of an economic and also of a geo-strategic nature. In 1999 an agreement on trade, development and co-operation (TDCA) was launched, with plans for a mutual opening within 12 years. Liberalisation in agriculture met with strong resistance within some Southern EU

member states, especially concerning wine and spirits, on which a separate treaty was signed. The development policy for South Africa is extensive and is covered by the EU budget, the EDB has a separate financing mandate for South Africa.

3. The most important agreements for development policy are those with African ACP states, which are home to a large proportion of the world's poor¹. All countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (except Mauritania) belong to the ACP states². In addition to the colonial history of some of the EU member states, a variety of agreements have, since the 60s, tied the EU to ACP countries (Lomé I to IV, Cotonou). Their main economic features were and are one-sided trade preferences, stabilisation mechanisms for export income as well as development aid in the framework of the European Development Fund (EDF).

These agreements are not considered to have been very successful³. They are often criticised because the selected preferences in agriculture are seen as a cause of the economic weakness of ACP states. However, this thesis cannot be maintained. According to the same logic, it could equally be claimed that as China or Vietnam, for instance, had conquered the markets of the industrial countries even before joining the WTO and without preferences (even despite the preferences for other countries), hence a facilitated or secure market access was not important for export success.

In actual fact, it is true that the ACP preferences of the EU exceed the usual EU preferences for all developing countries (Generalized System of Preferences, GSP), but many agricultural products have been excluded – especially those subject to EU market regulations and therefore the really interesting EU agricultural markets with high prices. Restrictive Rules of Origin and high standards of quality and hygiene have made sure that the real value of these preferences has been weakened. Moreover, the EU development policy, as determined by the ACP agreements, also has its obvious weaknesses. This, however, has also definitely not been decisive for the over-

all weak economic performance of the African ACP states. An entire assembly of structural causes must be considered responsible for the fact that these countries have over the last decades failed to more successfully grasp the possibilities of the EU preferences or other world market opportunities and instead have generally fallen far behind other regions of the world. The decisive question for the effectiveness of the ACP preferences is not the comparison before and after but the comparison with and (fictitiously) without preferences.

The ACP preferences certainly do not comply with the WTO rules. Basically, developing countries must be treated equally at the time of market opening. There are huge differences in development levels among ACP countries: countries such as Namibia, Botswana or Mauritius alongside the mostly small non-African countries in the Caribbean and in the Pacific have a relatively high level of development. An exceptional allowance (waiver) by the WTO, valid only until 2008, was already necessary in order to grant unified preferences to all ACP states that were not granted to other developing countries in the Cotonou Agreement. This waiver had to be “bought” with some market opening concessions by the EU to non-ACP developing countries, which lead to a loss in advantages (erosion of preferences) for the competing ACP countries.

The Negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements with African ACP States

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are currently being negotiated within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement for the purpose of rendering the trade relationships between the EU and the ACP countries more compatible with WTO rules and of providing stronger economic incentives. These are meant as regional free trade agreements between the EU and blocks of ACP countries. Principally, these blocks all have first to unite as customs unions and then, largely on the basis of reciprocity, gradually dismantle tariffs towards the EU. Reciprocity is a WTO prerequisite for free trade agreements. However, it

is not defined exactly. A general rule of thumb is that 90% of the goods transfer value need to be covered; an opening asymmetry (for instance 100% opening by the EU compared to 80% opening by the ACP blocks) is possible and probable in the case of the EPAs.

Alongside mutual reduction of tariffs, there are negotiations especially on regional integration within the different regional groupings, and also, depending on the different blocks, on non-tariff trade barriers, services, fisheries, customs procedures, trade-related themes like investment or competition, etc. The EPAs are to be in force in 2008. The transition periods are also subject to WTO conditionality - 12 to 30 years are currently being discussed. The African countries are negotiating in four blocks (ECOWAS plus Mauritania, ESA (a part of the COMESA countries without Egypt), SADC-EPA (a subgroup of 7 SADC countries) and CEMAC plus Sao Tomé). An option for alternatives to EPAs is actually provided in the Cotonou Agreement but has not been invoked up to now (see below).

Problems of Intensifying EU Trade Relations with Africa through Regional Agreements

The EU has selected a difficult and contentious path in choosing to set up trade relations with Africa through regional blocks. There is no precedent for the integration of such economically different partners. Additionally, the EPA blocks do not exist as yet in the constellations mentioned above, nor have they existed as economic communities. On the contrary, there is a large variety of different regional organisations, especially in Southern and Eastern Africa, with overlapping memberships (see Fig. 1). On average, each African country is a member of four regional organisations. The trade policy system objectives of these organisations are often not compatible. Additionally, the proliferation of different trade rules also often exacerbates the development of regional integration and transnational trade, which is already sufficiently difficult and costly due to administrative, geographical, climatic and infrastructural problems. Administrative problems, especially, lead to nega-

tive selection on the part of merchants, to monopolies sanctioned by the state or to cartels and generally to increased transaction costs.

Consolidation has proved to be extremely difficult for many governments. Generally, regional agreements in Africa often amount only to mere lip service, and implementation is weak. Several reasons contribute to this: The revenues from trade are easier to levy than domestic taxes and duties. The state budgets of many countries are to a large extent still dependent on them (SSA: 25-33%, industrial countries: < 2%). Additionally, the states are young and are reluctant to give up some of their limited *de facto* national sovereignty. Foreign trade is extremely vulnerable to corruption – each regulation is a potential source of income for politicians and civil servants and this reduces incentives for their reduction. A variety of half-hearted agreements retains scope for national and individual discretion. Many of these regional agreements (as also with the EU and the EPAs) are driven by political motives and historical alliances which substantially exceed economic objectives.

One of the main arguments for the EPAs is that the inconsistencies and trade obstacles of the existing initiatives will be reduced and that regional integration will be more strongly implemented at last. However, the EPAs also lead to new problems. The regional organisations that negotiate the EPAs are mostly still weak. They do not have sufficient financial and personnel resources and are in part only weakly integrated into national political networks. The most sophisticated integration organisations – UEMOA in West Africa, EAC and SACU in Eastern and Southern Africa – are not EPA partners. The admissions to the current EPA negotiating blocks are not all consistent. For instance, South Africa is the dominant partner of the oldest tariff union in the world, SACU. The other SACU countries were considered only to a limited extent in the TDCA negotiations between the EU and South Africa (see above) and are now negotiating EPAs within the framework of a reduced SADC group (South Africa is only admitted here as an observer for trade issues), which also includes some



Michael Brüntrup analyzes the EPAs in the context of trade, development and regional integration

non-SACU countries. Egypt, economically the most important country of the COMESA, does not belong to the ESA negotiating group. Tanzania is a member in the EAC, the only tariff union adopted in East Africa to date; however, it is negotiating the EPAs together with some of the SADC countries – probably because it has strong ties to South African corporations. The two other EAC partners are negotiating EPAs within the framework of the ESA group. It is also not clear how obstacles to trade between the regional blocks can be kept as low as possible, since the blocks often have artificial external boundaries and lively trade with each other.

A European Union trade policy offensive within the context of the WTO particularly aggravates the EPA negotiations. Most of the African ACP countries are among the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as defined by the United Nations. Special trade preferences may be granted to LDCs within the framework of the WTO. In 2001, the EU correspondingly gave them market access free of quotas and tariffs within the context of the Everything-But-Arms (EBA) initiative. Thus, from a mercantile point⁴ of view, these countries have no reason to join an EPA and to open up their own markets to the EU in order to gain access to the EU market. Only the restrictive Rules of Origin under the EBA initiative

and the relatively stronger uncertainty of preferential market access compared with contractually secure reciprocal market access under EPAs are still considerable market access incentives for this group of countries. Overall, these incentives to conclude EPAs are therefore only partly sound for LDCs.

Some larger African countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana or Cameroon are not LDCs. There is at least one such country in each of the regional groups. For these countries, after the WTO waiver for unilateral ACP preferential access has expired, the alternative way, instead of EPAs, to gain EU market access would be within the framework of the Generalized System of Preferences (GPS) of the EU. But under the GSP all developing countries are granted preferential market access to the EU. This would entail reduced preferences for ACP countries since in particular, the EU will not grant any additional market opening to larger developing countries with a high production potential for sensitive (agricultural) products. But since the Cotonou Agreement firmly states that no ACP country should be worse off in terms of market access than it was before, the pressure on the non-LDC countries to conclude EPAs does not seem to be too severe, either. But this could be deceptive: for all ACP countries, a revised, more generous GSP would mean a reduction in the re-

lative value of the trading position in the EU (preference erosion by the improvement in market access of third parties).

On the other hand EPAs aggravate the regional integration challenges from a purely mercantile point of view since the mutual South-South opening is combined with an extensive opening to the EU and a part of inner-African trade is therefore diverted towards the EU. However, from a neo-classical point of view, the African markets are less interesting for ACP countries than the European market, since product differentiation and comparative cost advantages are more pronounced between North and South than between partners from the South.

Whether weighing these arguments concerning market opening via tariff reductions will provide sufficient reasons to make it palatable for ACP countries to open up their markets to an unprecedented extent through EPAs is also not certain. The regional integration in the south - especially via EPAs - actually only makes sense when economies of scale, the learning effect from similar markets, as well as the easier readjustment process through a gradual market opening are taken into account. For this, however, next to customs tariffs, the non-tariff trade barriers to inner African trade must especially be reduced.

Inconsistencies of EPAs beyond Market Opening Policies

The EU is conscious of this weakness in the argumentation, particularly with regard to LDC market opening, which is why it especially emphasizes the other negotiation topics of the EPAs. However, here the EU is confronted with two other important inconsistencies:

a) On the one hand, many of these additional trade-related topics are charged with the fear that the EU is mainly pushing for market opportunities for EU enterprises in a mercantilist way, and that this will lead to domestic producers being displaced by European corporations gaining predominance, preventing of the growth of infant industries, and generally to negative effects for development. These fears are pri-

marily nourished by the observation that the EU (also publicly) argues in a considerably stronger mercantilist fashion in other trade negotiations in which the EU is involved.

There is little doubt that simpler tariff procedures are necessary in SSA, that more private investment is urgently needed or that there are considerable deficiencies in the public procurement system. However, many governments, including more liberal governments, as well as civil society organisations are opposed to these regulations being negotiated under the auspices of EPAs, since, within the context of the WTO, they have successfully fought against the adoption of the three so-called Singapore Issues (competition, investment, transparency in government procurement procedures).

For this, many believe these negotiation topics should only be regulated either within a regional context or even multilaterally. On the other hand, the EU and others have some reason to believe, not least because of their own experience with regional integration or with the WTO, that internal forces will not be sufficient to achieve better, more transparent regulations that are also more beneficial to competition (see above) unless there is pressure from outside to counter domestic African "vested interests". But even if in this case the EU probably has the better arguments, it also has a credibility problem.

b) A further problem is that many of these trade-related issues should only be integrated into a trade agreement if appropriate resources are available at the same time for implementation. Competition law without a functioning competition authority, investment regulations without adequate business infrastructure, efficient customs procedures and regulations without the corresponding administrative facilities for the legitimate checks on documentation and goods do not make much sense. The more ambitious the agreement, the greater the financial requirement for its implementation.

The demands of the ACP countries for more financial support for the EPA adjustment process seem to be one of the most important problems in the negotiations. For example, European NGOs are also pressing for concentrating the EDF on social sectors and insist on "aid for trade" outside the EDF. A further problem is that relatively rapid and flexible reactions are necessary for some EPA adjustment efforts, e.g. for unforeseeable losses in state revenue or cushioning the social consequences of the disintegration of some sectors. However, it is exactly this kind of assistance that is scarcely possible in the inertial EU development co-operation.

However, hardly any discussions on the financing of the implementation of EPAs has taken place until now. To date, the EU has rejected a direct coupling of EPA negotiations with the 10th EDF, which are set to proceed from 2008 to 2013, and is calling on the ACP states to apply for means from the EDF to meet the EPA requirements. The financial limit for the 10th EDF amounts to about 22.7 billion euros (for comparison, 13.5 billion could be used in the 9th EDF), and up to 50% could be allocated to the EPA process. However, this limit was fixed without consideration of the actual EPA adjustment costs, which can also only be estimated approximately at the earliest after completion of the negotiations. Also, in any case, many adjustment costs can hardly be quantified, particularly with regard to separating EPA effects from other influences.

In addition, the EU points out that funds in the old EDFs were not exhausted (the remaining sum was about 9.9 billion euros from earlier EDFs and obviously the absorption capacity of the ACP countries is limited). The inadequate absorption capacity is partly due to the well-known very effort-consuming EU application and procedural rules (which, however, differ from national DC rules already because of higher demands on legitimacy and transparency for an international or-

ganisation). The weak regional ACP organisations are obviously even less able to fulfil these regulations than the individual states.

Overall, co-ordination of trade and development policies within the EU has not been very convincing until now. An increase in the accompanying support to EPAs appears necessary and should be possible within the context of doubling development aid to Africa as promised by the EU. In addition, from an outside perspective, it is not very clear how far the EU determines priorities within the EDF and to what extent the ACP countries have freedom of choice. Considering the fact that there are 77 ACP countries, aid should be provided in a more flexible way, at least to some extent, and should only occur as a result of very good co-ordination of the member states, or better still by common EU aid.

Credibility Problems of the EU in EPAs as a By-product of Internally Oriented Policies, Particularly Agricultural Policy.

That the EU has not always gained credibility from developing countries is, apart from the inconsistencies in trade policies mentioned above, due to side effects of internal policies, in particular the common agricultural policy (CAP), on development. The negative effects on developing countries have hardly ever played a role in the definition of agricultural policy. Restructuring of domestic subsidies to achieve less trade distortion and reduction of export subsidies primarily occurred under pressure from the WTO (and maybe because of resistance in the EU to steadily rising agricultural budgets and continuing decreases in the farming population with simultaneously increasing ecological damage). ACP countries were already previously excluded from the most lucrative agricultural markets of the CAP, and there were complicated quota systems which restricted access for products such as sugar, beef or rum where the ACP countries were at least competitive with EU producers (not necessarily worldwide).

The most recent example of negative and problematic side effects of the CAP

(and poor co-ordination with development policies) is the reform of sugar market regulations. Here, the EBA initiative (see above) performed the role of a Trojan horse. The threat of huge sugar imports from LDC countries under the very high price for sugar on the internal EU market was massively used by the EU commission to overcome EU-internal resistance to a drastic reduction in the sugar price. The access of LDC producers to the EU sugar market, however, was delayed for a long time until sugar prices fell. Compensation for lost earnings will not be provided. Sugar was by far the most profitable product of the EBA initiative, at least in the short and medium term. Without the high sugar prices the EBA is not worth very much. This is not an argument against the reform of the EU sugar market, which is long overdue, but an important example of the lack of sensitivity with respect to the effects of EU agricultural policy on developing countries and the absence of coherence in trade, development and agricultural policies.

The EU agricultural sector still is not very competitive, as revealed by the continuously high protective measures required by the EU in the WTO negotiations. Moreover, the EU massively subsidizes the EU farming community. Although the subsidies are being increasingly transferred from trade distortion to a more neutral form, the European farmer now annually receive as much money per hectare in direct support as the average African farmer earns. Thus, as a result, fair competition is questionable. In addition, the EU agricultural markets are becoming increasingly out of reach for small African farmers because of rapidly increasing requirements in quality and proof of quality. In the case of mutual opening of the agricultural sector, EPAs thus contain many risks but few additional opportunities. There is very little credibility that the EU is negotiating in a development-friendly manner in the agricultural sector, which is so vital to the African countries.

Conclusion

All in all, the EU has moved into difficult terrain, due to its multifaceted, partly contradictory trade policy, together

with the burden of agricultural (trade) policy which is inadequately interwoven with development policies. However, the EU has also had to deal with very different and, in part, very difficult partners. Thus it is also obvious that in the context of complex partnerships these trade policies are very strongly influenced by non-economic objectives and cannot be measured solely in terms of economic criteria.

Therefore, the analysis above leads to the following conclusion: the EU appears to underestimate the problems of introducing EPAs. At the same time, the EU has a credibility problem when it postulates a development-oriented set-up for the EPAs. This perception does not only emerge against the background of other trade agreements and negotiations but because EU trade, development and agricultural policies are not always coherent, and indeed, cannot always be.

With this conclusion, a time frame of 2003-2007 for completing the negotiation of EPAs seems unrealistic. The EU probably could indeed force most ACP states to sign. However, the problems which would then appear later, and the lack of available instruments to rectify them, could provide a sustained deterioration in relations and may cause lasting damage to the reputation of the EU among developing countries. Hence this is not an option that can be recommended.

Instead, the underlying problems need to be addressed: the regional organisations must be strengthened in order to be able to appear as adequate negotiation partners. Like the EU, the regional organisations must carry out a more intensive dialogue with the national governments who, in the end, are meant to ratify the EPAs. Non-governmental participants (the private sector, farmers, consumers, non-governmental organisations) need to be increasingly included if they are supposed to be convinced of the positive development effects of the EPAs. In this way, credible and legitimate internal pressure could be generated on the respective governments to promote transparency, economic policies, legal security and cost efficiency which are in line with market requirements. In order to achieve

ve this, the EU must first of all abandon mercantile demands by primarily promoting liberalisation with a strong regional or multilateral orientation. Additionally, the EU must continue to strengthen the coherence of trade, development and ag-

ricultural policies and assure additional, flexible and effective support during and after the implementation of the EPAs. Effective protection mechanisms are indispensable considering the high uncertainty in the effects of the EPAs.

Endnotes

- 1 In absolute numbers more poor live in South Asia, but there the relative proportions of the poor and the depth of poverty are considerably lower and the trend towards poverty reduction is positive, whereas in SSA between 1990 and 2001 (the last year for which comparative regional figures are given in the UN's MDG report 2005) the trend is negative both relatively and absolutely.
- 2 South Africa has been an ACP country since 1998, but has not joined the trade and finance parts of the Lomé and the Cotonou agreements, and is not considered by the EU to be a developing country in the stricter sense (http://www.bmz.de/de/wege/ez_eu/eu_ways/akpstaaten/index.html).
- 3 Preferences generally are looked at rather sceptically in the economic literature, nevertheless they are usually a dominant aspect of inter-state economic agreements.
- 4 Mercantile here means negotiating trade agreements with the objective of conquering export markets (offensive interests) while protecting one's own markets as much as possible (defensive interests). Seen from a welfare-economic viewpoint, a unilateral market opening is also of advantage for the national economy being liberalised, but it presupposes the theory of functioning markets and ignores adjustment costs.

3. Europe's Quest for Economic Partnerships Agreements: More a Matter of Self Interest than of Partnership

Paul Goodison

We have been discussing that Africa needs to be more integrated in the global economy. Let me start by stressing that Africa is in fact integrated into the world economy. The key issue rather is the basis of its integration: How do we transform it in a such a way that Africans add more value to what Africans produce for national, regional and international markets, and that they create employment for Africans and growth in Africa, which is required to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)? That's the starting point for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) from the ACP point of view: How do these trade agreements support the structural transformation of African economies?

Africans recognize that they have the primary responsibility for getting their national and regional policies right to support that process. But they want to see a trade relationship with Europe which encourages that process and supports it - not one that undermines increased value addition in Africa for national, regional and international markets.

Some European corporations have advanced strategies for taking control of African industries

We have heard people say that the European Strategy towards Africa is at an early stage of development. But that is only true if you look at governments. When I look at European corporations in the agriculture and food sector I see

them at a very advanced stage in their strategic thinking. Since the signing of the EU-South Africa trade agreement, two thirds of the South African dairy industry has come under European control, and South Africa is now the basis for gaining control of the regional dairy sector. For example, negotiations are currently taking place for the purchase of the major South African sugar company which controls the entire Malawian and Zambian sugar industries as well as half of Tanzania's and more than a third of both Mozambique's and Swaziland's sugar industries. Currently a French and a British company are fighting over who will get control over African sugar. It is quite amazing how 8.8 billion euros of restructuring support for the European sugar sector seem to find their way to Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and South Africa.

The fisheries sector in Southern Africa is also dominated by European companies. For example, you find Dutch interest in it, and the tuna industry is dominated by the French oversees fleets in the Indian Ocean. And I am only talking about the agricultural sector here - not about the retail sector, not about mining.

So I am quite amazed when I hear people say that the EU is only interested in development and has no commercial interest. I wonder whether the European Commission and the member states are actually talking to European businesses who are actively involved in making money in Africa and out of Africa. So why do the EU and its member states pursue the signing of free trade agreements not



Taking a critical look at the EPAs: Paul Goodison

only with African countries but throughout the globe? I have been asked to answer the question if the EU is guided by self interest or fair partnership. I would say 60 percent self interest, 40 percent fair partnership.

Flexibility towards Africa would compromise the EU's global trade agenda

The EU has a single global trade policy agenda which is designed to promote jobs and growth in Europe. It does not only aim at the trade in goods, but also at the trade in services and at trade related areas. It pursues this policy by using two vehicles: multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and agreements with individual states or groups of states on free trade areas. If it does not move forward in one forum it shifts the weight to the other. As a European consumer and taxpayer I think the European Commission is doing a splendid job in promoting the interests of European industry through its free trade area policy. But the activist committed to promoting economic development is, as you see, loosing lots of hair because of this policy, and my beard was turning gray so I had to shave it.

Let's take the obscure issue of geographical designations of origin. The

EU wants to restrict the use of product names like Roquefort cheese or champagne: only producers from areas where these products originally come from, like the Champagne for champagne, shall be allowed to market their products under the famous names. The EU was trying to get this issue on the WTO agenda but failed. So it shifted the focus and insisted in having provisions on geographical designations of origin in trade agreements with Mexico and South Africa. When the EU gets these provisions in bilateral agreements, it goes back to the WTO and says: We should have international rules on this, because all these countries have signed up to it in bilateral agreements.

The point is that the EU has global trade policy objectives. If, in trade negotiations with Africa, it compromises the principles that underline those policies, then it undermines the integrity of the wider EU policy. That is why there is so little flexibility in the negotiations on EPAs. It is not because African markets are so important to European companies - though some of the markets clearly are in some sectors. Did you know for example that Africa takes one in ten exports of European cereal products now - not standard wheat and maize but value added cereal products like pasta, biscuits and flour?

EPAs are undermining the benefits of regional market integration

Limited flexibility is the first of two major issues that are important to EPAs. Africa needs flexibility in trade agreements so that regional markets are not just created on paper, but genuine trade flows occur between African countries, which then attract investment in new production capacity for regional markets. Therefore EPAs need to be structured in ways that give Africa enough space to build these markets. Asking them – like the EU does – to open up to European exports while they are still trying to build regional markets is fundamentally compromising the development benefits of regional integration.

The second major issue is building productive capacities in Africa. Here EPAs will entail huge adjustment costs.

A Commonwealth secretariat study has estimated that some 9.3 billion euros are required for the ACP countries over ten years to finance central programs of restructuring. The EU is nowhere near considering to provide that level of assistance. It is not even willing to enter into the debate. And even if the European Commission got the money, it is simply not geared up to giving time sensitive support for economic restructuring which has to take its lead from the private sector. Its systems are designed for state to state collaboration in long term development programs like physical infrastructure programs. So we in Europe have to fundamentally rethink the division of labor between EU member states and the European Commission before supporting the African vision of structural transformation which underpins their approach to EPAs.

4. Discussion Panel 3**Development through Investment in the Agro-Industry?**

Michael Brüntrup contradicted Mr. Goodison by saying that European investment in Africa was a good sign: It showed that investment in Africa is profitable and that local markets can be served by locally produced goods. According to him, the aim should be to build agro-industry and thus provide for more value added in Africa. “Of course large and multilateral European companies should not be the only ones to do this. What is needed is a good investment climate and a competition policy in order not to create monopolies”, he said. Mr. Brüntrup also emphasized the importance of linking local farmers to growing markets in urban areas as well as to local agro-industry, but he added that until now there have been no efforts in this direction on the part of the EU.

Flexibility required in the timetable of EPA negotiations

Angelo Mondlane underlined the need for flexibility in the negotiation of EPAs, because their aim is to support the development of African sub-regional markets. According to him, this presupposes giving the regional economic groupings in Africa enough time to build and consolidate. He explained that customs unions were in the process of being established in Southern Africa, but more time was needed for this. Any premature declaration of a customs union just because the EU demanded this for the sake of negotiating EPAs would cause serious problems.

On this issue Alexis Valqui remarked that the inflexible timetable of the EPA negotiations is a result of international trade law (which he deemed important for more justice in world trade): The preference system that the EU conceded to ACP states under the Lomé conventions is not reciprocal and therefore can no longer continue under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO has granted a waiver, which means the system will be allowed to continue in place during reform negotiations, but only for a limited time.

Are alternative EPA draft proposals ignored?

Paul Goodison told the audience that the Eastern and Southern African region (ESA) had produced its own draft EPA proposal. He envisaged a ten-year moratorium on any reduction of tariffs on imports from the EU, followed by a twenty year period in which these tariffs should be progressively reduced for 60 percent of all these imports. Mr. Goodison accused the European Commission of simply ignoring the existence of these proposals. It chooses instead to debate a proposal for the SADC region based on the EU-South Africa trade development and cooperation agreement, which eliminates tariffs on 86 percent of all the EU exports over a twelve-year period. “The ESA draft conveniently never gets to peoples’ desks and is dropped in the garbage bin, and we call that negotiations”, Goodison said.

He also stressed that taxes on imports, mainly from the EU, their main trading partner, are the main source of govern-



Contribution from the audience on trade relations between the EU and Africa

ment revenue in many African states. These taxes are easy to collect; setting up alternative systems of taxation would be extremely difficult and costly. “There is no point in giving aid to these governments if we simultaneously pursue policies which destroy their revenue base without helping them to put alternative taxation policies in place. That it is a recipe for the collapse of health services, education services, agricultural extension work, road maintenance, and telecommunication systems in Africa”, Goodison said.

The double-edged effects of EPAs on regional integration

Mr. Brüntrup expressed the view that EPAs could as well have positive effects on regional integration. According to him, African countries have for many years been talking about regional integration, but little has been done concretely, so pressure seems to be needed and may be helpful for regional integration. EPAs may create such pressure on governments to become active on trade-related issues like investment, competitiveness and common standards.

Doubts were raised in the audience on this issue. It was remarked that attempts to negotiate multilateral agreements on new trade-related issues like investment protection have met with resistance in

the WTO. The EU wants these issues to be included in EPAs, but the SADC group, for example, is only prepared to negotiate this if the exigencies of regional integration are taken into account and if negotiations do not overtax the capabilities of the ACP states. Mr. Brüntrup replied that this is consistent with a political decision of the African Union (AU) not to enter into negotiations on new trade-related issues in the WTO, but that a number of experts - African economists and also African delegates in EPA negotiations - seem to take a different view. Also, agreements on investment already exist in some regions, and they need to be harmonized. According to Mr. Brüntrup, there is an obvious need to stop capital flight and increase investment in Africa. Rules on investment and competitiveness would be helpful here, though not a solution in itself. He saw too few attempts on the part of the private sector and civil society to convince Africans instead of putting political pressure on them through EPAs.

Mr. Valqui underlined that in order to be compatible with WTO rules, trade preferences as provided for in EPAs between the EU and developing states must be mutual but not necessarily symmetrical, and they must cover 90 percent of trade. This means that 10 percent on each side or - in an asymmetrical arrangement - up to 20 percent on the side of

poor countries may continue to be protected for perhaps decades. According to Mr. Valqui, studies indicate that this is sufficient to allow the protection of sensitive products in most ACP countries. Problems can, however, occur when the range of these products differs from country to country in one region, so that the range of sensitive products for all countries combined might be more than 20 percent of the region's products, added Mr. Valqui.

Germany's role in the EPA process

Concerning Germany's influence on the EPA negotiations, Alexis Valqui explained that the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development is responsible in Germany, while in most other EU member states the ministries

of economy or finance are in the driving seat. He underlined that Germany supports the development aims of EPAs but is confronted with the interests of 24 other member states, many of whom are enthusiastic about the opening up of the EU market.

In his final statement Paul Goodison doubted that the EU would make the huge funds available that are needed to support structural change in partner countries following trade reform, and make them available in time. He argued that already less and less money from the European Development Fund is going to agriculture or business development. “There is a massive decline of EU investment in productive areas where you need to put the money to support preparations for EPAs”, Goodison said.

IV. Shielding the EU or overcoming root causes? EU Africa policy between migration and development

1. Limiting Migration by Border Controls, or Enhancing the Development Effects of Migration - Two Contradictory Approaches in European Migration Policy

Torsten Moritz

We heard this morning that the migration chapter of the EU Africa Strategy is fairly disappointing. That does not mean that migration between Africa and Europe is low on the agenda – on the contrary. While we are discussing here, delegations of the EU and the African Union (AU) member states are meeting on expert level in Algiers in order to prepare the ministerial conference later this year on exactly the question of migration and development. At the same time, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has convened a high level working group which in Brussels is discussing labor migration as a task for involving migrants in development and integration.

The question is whether the EU Africa Strategy and the policies related to it are aimed at shielding the EU or rather at overcoming the root causes of migration. For the time being the jury is still out on that question. We have both tendencies. On the one hand, we would like to have the EU protected and create what is often called the fortress of Europe. On the other hand we have an impetus to say how we can combat root causes of forced migration and use migration as a tool to enhance development in countries people have come from.

Most migration originating in Africa is within the continent

In discussing this it is important to keep a couple of things in mind. First, most migration in Africa is still south-south migration, that is migration within Africa. Migration across the Mediter-

anean is highly present in the media but not necessarily the most significant in terms of numbers or impact on development. Looking at migration from the perspective of the EU, we have to keep in mind that migration across the Mediterranean is very important but, at least for the time being, east-west migrants are equally if not more numerous. However if we look at demographic development, it seems clear that east-west migration will become less and less important relative to migration from sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb into Europe. This is why the political framework of this movements is so important.

Cooperation between the EU and Africa on migration issues is not at all new. The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the EU and 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states includes the famous Article 13 on political cooperation and dialogue on migration. It goes to great lengths in describing the modalities of the readmission of people who have come to Europe through ACP countries or who are nationals of ACP countries. For the last four to five years, almost every European Council has discussed the connection between migration and development - very often with the connotation of saying: we penalize countries who do not cooperate with us in migration questions by cutting development aid to them. Also the Barcelona Process with Northern Africa, which is being taken over step by step by what is called the European Neighborhood Strategy, aims at having a circle of friends around the EU - in terms of migration we could call it a buffer zone where immigration into the EU is managed from beyond its borders.



Engaged in discussion: Bernd Luderemann, Torsten Moritz, from left to right.

So the EU Africa Strategy does not come out of the blue. It is fairly short and very unspecific on what should be the EU strategy on migration towards Africa. Therefore I would like to highlight two documents which have been issued around the same time by the European Commission. The first is the conclusions of the Hampton Court Summit, the summit of the heads of state under the British presidency in October 2005, which was in December also taken up by the European Council. The second is the Communication on Migration and Development by the European Commission which has not yet been officially endorsed by the Council.

Two communications from the Commission with quite different approaches

The conclusions of the Hampton Court Summit have a strong focus on Africa that was influenced by the incidents in Ceuta and Melilla last year. It identifies a need to strengthen the cooperation on migration questions with Africa and all actors in Africa and mainly sees this cooperation from the perspective of limiting migration. It says a lot about enhancing border control, strengthening the capacity of the European border agency, intercepting vessels in the Mediterranean and various other

initiatives for enhancing migration control in the Mediterranean and for cooperation with countries in Northern Africa. The paper also mentions a balanced dialogue with the AU, but is very short in describing what this should exactly entail. It speaks of building capacity for migration management in countries of origin and transit, but this is a logic of containing migration. In a little sideline the paper describes the possibilities for legal migration, but as this is an issue which is still, with very few exceptions, in the national competence of EU member states alone, there is very little the EU can really offer here.

In the Communication of the European Commission on Migration and Development, we see a slightly different approach. It starts by saying migration is a fact, we had better live with it. It then tries to identify how migration can be a productive, positive factor for development in countries of origin. It comes up with arguments that are not completely new but have for the first time been lifted to such a high official level in the EU. One important question is: How can the diaspora of a specific country contribute to the development of that country? How can knowledge and money be transferred back to the country of origin in a way which supports sustainable development in that country – a development which is really owned by the

people who come from this country or still live there?

The second question is to look very specifically at remittances, that is at the money which people who have migrated from a country send back to it. It has been established that the amount of remittances is by far higher than anything which we can count as official development assistance. However, remittances, by their very definition, are private income. People have privately earned this money and are free to use it as they wish. So we cannot necessarily say we use it for development. However the Communication suggests that we look at the conditions under which remittances are sent back. At the moment it is mainly companies such as Western Union who make a lot of money out of it. If the costs of the transfers could be reduced, more money would potentially be available for development in the countries to which the money is sent. So the question is: Can we construct a financial transfer system which allows more remittances to be used for sustaining families, but also for investment?

A last question is how do we address brain drain. The Communication says brain drain is a serious problem. We have more doctors for example from Malawi in Manchester than we have in Malawi. That is obviously a very serious issue with lots of repercussions on the economy and society of the countries of origin. So the paper tries to identify what we can do ensure that brain drain does not mean knowledge is completely lost in the country of origin, but is also put to use for the countries from which people come. The *paspartout* answer seems to be circular migration: People come for a certain period of time, then go back and take back the knowledge they have acquired. This seems to create a win-win situation. But a problem I see here is that you might revitalize the "Gastarbeiter" (guest worker) concept. Personal life plans change and people who initially plan to stay abroad only for a specific period of time might end up not wanting to go back any more. So there are integration issues related to that, and the issue of circular migration is something that you need to look into more carefully.

European migration policy is fairly incoherent

For me at the moment, European migration policy presents a fairly incoherent picture. That has to do with the different actors involved. We have on the one hand the logic of justice and home affairs ministers and the justice and home affairs department of the European Commission. It is still a predominantly restrictive logic: We would like to keep our borders as closed as possible, allow a very selective entry into the EU and cooperate with the AU and African partners on that. There also is a development logic which is more about the question: Cannot migration be a new issue we take on board in order to enhance development? At the moment a discussion is ongoing on which of these two logics will become predominant or if there will be any way of combining the two. A colleague from the European Commission yesterday sent a report of the unit on immigration and asylum which says: Until now we have been speaking two different languages in development on the one hand, justice and home affairs on the other; we are beginning to understand each other now. This seems to indicate that there is still a long way to go before we come to productive cooperation and coherence in these issues.

A last reminder that also relates to the situation of Ceuta and Melilla last year. Exactly during the time when European justice and home affairs ministers were discussing how to stop migrants at the border of the Spanish enclaves, an AU delegation visited Brussels. Its president Alpha Omar Konaré clearly said: We are willing to discuss migration issues with the EU, but only if the EU discusses its trade policies, tariffs and agricultural subsidies with us. Beyond the logic of justice and home affairs and development respectively, we also have to look at the issue of trade, agriculture and coherence in EU policy if we are serious about addressing root causes of migration.

2. The Migration Pressure is Caused by Africa's Economic and Social Crisis

Mehdi Lalou

The question of migration is closely linked to the lack of rights and to the situation of deep economic, social and political crisis in Africa. A lack of democracy and of civil rights is common in most African countries - only some, like South Africa, Senegal, Mali and to some extent Morocco, have more or less democratic regimes. Moreover there is a lack of public security in many sub-Saharan countries, a number are subject to civil war.

Widening gaps between sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb, and between the Maghreb and Europe

A symptom of the crisis is the economic gap between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in terms of per capita production, the gap between Mali and Algeria is now more than 1 to 7, so Malians are coming to Algeria for work. The gap between Chad and Libya is 1 to 27, between Nigeria and Tunisia about 1 to 12. At the same time we have a similar gap between the Maghreb and Europe: 1 to 14 between Algeria and the Netherlands, 1 to almost 10 between Tunisia and Italy and 1 to 18.5 between Morocco and France. Moreover, this gap has greatly widened, for example between Spain and Morocco: In 1973 it was 1 to 4, and we did not have migration from Morocco to Spain. Today the gap is 1 to 18. The number of Moroccans in Spain has accordingly increased from less than 33.000 in 1984 to about half a million today.

This happened in spite of the partnership between the EU and most states of the Southern Mediterranean started in

1995, the so-called Barcelona process. Its main goals were to establish a common area of peace and stability, comprising the EU and the Maghreb, through a political and security dialogue; to create an area of shared prosperity through economic partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area; and to bring peoples together and promote the understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. We see today that these goals have not been achieved. And migration is the main problem today between the Maghreb and Europe, although migration in Africa is indeed still mainly inside the continent - only about 3 percent of immigrants to the EU come from Africa.

The EU Africa Strategy is too optimistic about the situation in Africa

What do we in Northern Africa think about the EU Strategy for Africa? Let me present three theses on this question. First, the EU's analysis of the situation in Africa is not quite appropriate. The Strategy says Africa is on the move, international awareness of the situation in Africa has improved in recent years, and the continent is giving signs that there is real momentum for change. I do not agree with this and feel the situation is worse than described in the EU Africa Strategy. For example, Africa accounts for only about 2 percent of world trade and its share of global manufactured exports is almost negligible. The continent is receiving today less than 2.5 percent of global foreign direct investment, and three quarters of the added value produced with this investment is transferred



Commenting on the increasing migration from Africa to the EU: Mehdi Lalou

out of the continent. Moreover, the main areas of foreign investment are monopolistic sectors – either the exploitation of raw materials or public sectors like water, energy and communications. 40 percent of all Africans survive on less than one dollar a day, and only six out of ten African children go to primary school. Africa is also the continent which is the hardest hit by communicable diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.

Second thesis: The engagement of the EU in Africa is less strong than it appears. In 2003 the EU's development aid to Africa totalled 15 billion euros, compared to 5 billion in 1985. This is significant. But we have to add that the EU comprised only 12 states in 1985 while it has 25 members now; gross national income in the EU is four to five times greater now than in 1985. Above this, a big part of the European aid flows back to Europe, because of conditions attached to it, and so benefits European enterprises or development professionals.

Preventing irregular immigration is one of Europe's major interests

Third thesis: European interests in Africa come into play that are not stated in the documents of the European Commission or the European Council. For us in Northern and Southern Africa, it looks like three interests are driving European Africa policies. First, the main interest of both the EU and its member states is to stop irregular migration from Africa to Europe and maybe promote what they call responsible migration. Second, some European states have a strong interest in African raw materials. And third, economically, European actors are mainly interested in strategic sectors where investment brings high and quick financial return. This means long-term development in Africa is not an important goal. If European policies remain unchanged, there is not much prospect for reducing the migration pressure in Africa.

3. A Gradual Opening of Borders Can Create Win-Win Situations

Dietrich Thränhardt

Attempts have often been made to use development aid to prevent migration. This simply cannot work because development does not lead to less migration; on the contrary, it will at least initially lead to more migration. If you introduce modern technologies, for example tractors, into agrarian societies, you reduce the need for rural labour, and this will cause surplus labourers to migrate. That is why the economic take-off in Germany in the 19th century was accompanied by a huge emigration movement towards America. Only after the industrialisation in Germany was accomplished in about 1900 did this emigration slow down and end. We are today witnessing the same phenomenon in Turkey: We see there a dramatic industrialisation process which generates rapid economic growth while at the same time a high number of people are prepared to emigrate, as the demographic transition to lower birth rates is not yet accomplished.

Development cannot stop migration – it will rather increase it

So development, at least in its early stages, always leads to more migration: Internal migration from traditional to modern, growing sectors of the economy (without which there cannot be development); and also emigration to foreign countries. Thus using development aid to counter migration is a flawed concept in so far as it attempts to counter the root causes of migration. It can only work if aid is used to bribe authoritarian regimes to prevent their citizens from emigrating.

A new school of thought has tried to show a positive correlation between immigration and development. The starting point for the reassessment was the long boom in the US during the presidency of Bill Clinton, which saw one of the longest phases of high economic growth in history. Clearly, one of the reasons for this was that labour from the whole globe was available to the US economy. The prime example is the IT industry in California, which made use of an abundant supply of IT engineers from India – the immigration quota was raised each year during the boom. Ironically German development assistance has contributed to the education of these engineers in India, but afterwards Germany did not allow them to come and work here, so they went to the US. This created a win-win situation: Emigration of engineers from India resulted first in growth in the US and in a second step in the development of an IT industry in India. When the boom ended and IT prices fell internationally, the Indian industry came out stronger because their price advantage became more important.

Well-managed migration can benefit both the recipient country and the country of origin

This kind of win-win situation has been described in a report of the Indian parliament. The Global Commission on International Migration initiated by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, whose report has recently been presented in German translation, also strongly argues in this direction. Unfortunately the German minister of the interior,



Dietrich Thränhardt explains the interrelation between development and migration

Mr. Schäuble, has politely ignored these arguments, sticking to his strategy of deterring immigration. This attitude is in general predominant among interior ministers and politicians concerned with internal security.

Of course allowing immigration does not always and automatically lead to win-win situations. This is, for example, clearly not the case with the high number of Malawian doctors working in Manchester. The emigration of African medical professionals to Great Britain, North America or Australia is of course very problematic and a heavy burden for health systems in Africa.

Remittances to poor countries from diaspora communities in rich countries are another important link between development and migration. Let me elaborate on this a little bit. The World Bank has calculated that globally these transfers are about two and a half times greater than official development aid. They are also more stable and reliable than and also more stable than private foreign investment. We may argue over what kind of transfers are more important for development. But we do know that a lot of overhead costs are associated with development aid, whereas remittances actually reach part of the population of poor countries and create demand which stimulates the economy.

Transfer of cultural values and attitudes

Furthermore, migration also leads to a transfer of cultural and social values and capabilities. In Bangalore in India you can see very clearly that migrants have also brought home modern attitudes. For example, corruption is in decline, the number of children per family is decreasing (whether we regard this as positive or not), and people who have worked in the US try to introduce modern business practices. Finally, migration may have an influence on political development, particularly in countries where opposition groups are not tolerated at home but can influence the situation from abroad.

In sum: migration cannot be prevented. The political task is to shape it in such a way as to bring about win-win situations. In the case of the EU's relations to Africa, the need is to devise strategies that combine migration and trade in order to promote development. For example, it is necessary to raise the productivity of African agriculture, and the exchange of personnel and knowledge can contribute to this. The same kind of exchange can be envisaged for the mining and mineral resources sectors, and of course for industry, which is the least developed sector in sub-Saharan Africa.

In Europe the experience made with the controlled opening up of borders has

been very positive. Forty years ago nobody would have imagined that you could totally open the borders between 25 European countries, which is the situation today. The strategy in the EU should be to gradually open up borders for other countries as well, beginning with permitting controlled immigration. In the

long run, open borders are also possible in relation to Africa, but only in the long run. However, we can use immigration quotas and porous borders with individual African countries – Morocco and Tunisia are obvious candidates – to gradually move in this direction.

4. Discussion Panel 3

Shielding the EU or Overcoming Root Causes of Migration? EU Africa Policy between Migration and Development

All panelists agreed that migration must be seen as a fact; it cannot be stopped but rather has to be organized in a more prudent way. Different approaches to immigration on the part of the European Commission and its member states were debated: integration policy, asylum policy, development effects of migration, and cooperation with Maghreb countries in restricting immigration from Africa.

Migration policy after September 11th – back to space zero

One focus was the shift from development to security policy since 11th September 2001. Torsten Moritz explained: “The European Council in Tampere in October 1999 for the first time said we need a common immigration policy for the EU. Since then we had changes in political climate in some EU member states and the agenda was: We need a pro-active immigration policy because we will need immigration. September 11th 2001 set the agenda back to space zero.” According to Mr. Moritz, one conclusion after the terror attacks of September 11th was that the integration of immigrants had failed. But this was rather a result of the fact that politicians had not taken on board the fact that not just manpower but people with individual plans, with families, with a personality and their own wishes were coming to the EU.

Currently the priority is the integration of the new member countries

Dietrich Thränhardt explained why the European Commission has not yet elaborated a strategy to regulate migration or to establish a consistent EU integration policy: “The European Commission is still committed to the integration of the ten new member countries. They tell the older members, especially Germany and Austria: Open your borders for Polish, Czech and Slovak migrants.” But Mr. Thränhardt saw all European countries except Turkey on the verge of a demographic crisis, which means they depend on immigration to slow down the shrinking of their populations. However, innovative migration policies especially with respect to Africa, for instance exchange programmes between European and African universities, are still missing. He added that Africa – in comparison to Asia – is not seen as a valuable pool for immigrants going, for example, to institutions of higher education.

One important point concerned circular migration. Mr. Thränhardt and Mr. Moritz warned that strict visa regimes designed to reduce immigration have counter-productive effects: Immigrants will be more reluctant to travel to their home countries (which they need to do when they consider going back) once they fear they will not be allowed back into the EU. Entry restrictions are also an incentive for migrants to keep their nationality of origin and have two nationalities, i.e. so as to be able to travel more easily. Rather than restricting entry at the borders, the EU



Klaus Schilder, WEED, concerned about the EU's migration policy

should give migrants the possibility of circular migration, Thränhardt said: “It is no contradiction to be integrated in Europe and still move back to your country of origin.” He demanded European policies to organize visa regimes and residence permits in such a way that people can easily return home while also strengthening reintegrating programs.

Putting North African states in the frontline of EU immigration restrictions

By instead trying to restrict border crossing from the south, the EU is, according to Mehdi Lalou, calling on Maghreb countries to act as a barrier between Sub-Sahara Africa and Europe. He argued that this cannot work for political reasons and counteracts attempts to bring all African countries together in the African Union. Mr. Lahlou saw EU migration policy as attempt to install a barrier to development in the Maghreb. Moritz added that Morocco sent would-be immigrants who reached its border with Spain at the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla into the desert under deplorable conditions. This was a reaction to pressure on Morocco from Spain, which in turn was reacting to pressure from other EU countries, to prevent immigration from Africa.

From the refugee situation in the Maghreb the discussion turned to the issue of asylum. So far each European state accepts asylum the decisions of other EU member states, and there are EU directives on asylum procedures and reception conditions. But a common regulation on the conditions under which asylum is granted is still missing, Moritz said. In theory everybody who manages to enter an EU member country has the right to launch an asylum claim. In practice, on the Italian island of Lampedusa or in Melilla, people are sent back without being given this chance, Moritz said. According to him, this is not an isolated case: “De facto we have no effective access to the asylum procedure. That is a general trend, it can happen to you in Germany, in Poland or wherever you go.”

Development effects of migration: remittances and brain drain

Asked about the uses and limits of remittances for development, Torsten Moritz remarked that they can contribute to development in countries of origin, probably mainly on local or regional level. But remittances cannot finance national health systems or physical infrastructure like electricity. Here official development assistance is still needed. Remittances also tend not to flow to the

poorest countries or areas because some social mobility, a minimum of capital and a certain amount of social contacts is needed to organize migration, and thus the least developed countries usually do not generate huge migration flows to the EU.

According to Mr. Moritz, the migration debate in the EU is too strongly focused on highly skilled migrants. The de facto immigration of people working in lower skilled jobs is not sufficiently taken into account. These migrants often come to Europe under irregular circumstances, in some states their status may afterwards be regularized. Other, regular ways of organizing this immigration into lower skilled jobs are necessary, said Mr. Moritz.

The audience was of the opinion that every country needs human resources and therefore the brain drain should be stopped and qualified workers should be supported in developing countries. Mr. Lahlou agreed. He viewed the economic and financial disparities bet-

ween Europe and Africa as a major cause of migration that Europe needed to address. According to Lalou, South Africa in the south and the Maghreb with Egypt in the north, which are more developed than the rest of Africa, could help Europe support social development in Africa. Unfortunately, North Africa, according to him, has its own problems. Lalou agreed to a remark from the audience that the Barcelona Process has failed: It had led neither to more investment in the Maghreb nor to less social inequality. For Lalou this was chiefly due to a lack of democracy and good governance in the Maghreb. He would like Europe to play a role in improving this. But he found Europe's messages in this field contradictory. He cited as an example the fact that the EU advocates human rights while some of its member countries are assisting Libya, Tunisia or Algeria, whose serious human rights problems are well known, in the building of detention centres for migrants.

V. Conclusion

Does the EU Africa Strategy point the way towards a more coherent European Africa policy? Most conference participants agreed that in spite of its shortcomings, it represents a step forward in this direction. The Strategy mainly assembles and reaffirms already existing principles and approaches, but its significance lies in trying to integrate them in an overarching guideline. Equally significant is that the European Commission, the European Council (representing the member states), and the European Parliament have been able to agree on a common approach in spite of differing interests, not least among member states.

However, many questions were raised on specific aspects of the EU Africa Strategy. It was observed that it is not the result of agreements between European and African partners but a unilateral declaration from the part of the EU. As such it should state the EU's vested interests in Africa more clearly. Among these, it was suggested, are avoiding threats to European security and preventing immigration, but also economic interests.

The Strategy deals with European policies towards Africa in the areas of peace and security, of human rights and governance, and of development, economic growth and trade. The first – security – is given much importance as a precondition for progress in other areas. This integrated approach was not disputed in principle during the conference. Concerns were raised, however, that the EU should not fund its support for peace operations from already earmarked development aid but make additional money available. The principle of “African ownership”, which is very

prominent in the Strategy's approach to peace and security, was identified as potentially problematic: Here the EU relies heavily on African organisations, the African Union (AU) in the first instance. Yet the AU is still building its capacity, and it is not clear that these organisations will rise to the challenges of regional security – even with assistance from the EU. Similarly, in the field of human rights the EU Strategy relies heavily on peer reviews among African states, an approach that does not seem to work in cases like Zimbabwe.

In the area of development, growth and trade, the EU is negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with four regional groupings of African states. They follow the principle of mutual free trade rather than giving EU trade preferences to ACP countries. Doubts were raised during the conference that this approach may actually undermine regional markets in Africa and diminish state revenues that, in many African countries, depend on tariffs on trade. Furthermore, huge investments in productive sectors in Africa are necessary if the continent is to benefit from EPAs. The Strategy promises an increase in aid to Africa, but it seems unclear whether the EU is prepared to make enough funds available in time to cover these needs. Besides, the effects of the EU Agricultural Policy on poor countries are not addressed in the EU Africa Strategy.

The conference also discussed European migration policies. It was stressed that the aim should be to manage them in such a way that they benefit Africa as well as Europe. This is, however, not the current policy in Europe; a restrictive



An attentive audience follows the concluding remarks

approach to immigration has again been predominant since the terror attacks of September 11th, although the Commission – but not the Council – seems to be reassessing this. The EU is pressuring Northern African states to prevent migrants from reaching Europe. This is unlikely to work in the long run and may even run counter to attempts to promote democracy and human rights in Northern Africa.

One of the biggest doubts about the EU Africa Strategy is the extent to which its

integrated approach – an achievement in principle despite its shortcomings – will really be politically implemented in such a way as to make practical policies more coherent. This will not be possible without going against some vested interests in the EU and its member states and restructuring competencies of EU institutions. So the EU Africa Strategy may – if things go well – be the beginning of a process that will gradually make Europe's approach towards Africa more consistent and coherent.

VI. Authors

Michael Brüntrup

Dr. Michael Brüntrup, is an agricultural economist and works as a senior research fellow at the German Development Institute (DIE) in Bonn. Before joining the DIE, he worked at the University of Stuttgart-Hohenheim and as a freelance consultant in Latin America, Asia and Sub-Sahara-Africa. He received his PhD degree from the University of Stuttgart-Hohenheim. His main areas of work at the DIE are international agricultural markets, international agricultural trade policy and agricultural policies in Sub-Sahara-Africa.

Contact: michael.bruentrup@die-gdi.de

Paul Goodison

Dr. Paul Goodison works at the European Research Office, a not-for-profit non-governmental research unit specialising in the analysis of issues involved in Southern Africa's trade, aid and agricultural sector relations with the European Union (EU). ERO was established in late 1988 and Dr. Goodison has been undertaking research on EU-Southern Africa aid, trade and agricultural relations since this date. The research programme on EPAs was initiated in 1996 and was an extension of work undertaken on EU-South Africa trade relations initiated in 1990.

Contact: 2pg@pandora.be

Jeffery Isima

Jeffery Isima holds a BSc in International Relations from the University of Ife in Nigeria and an MA in Development Studies from the University of The Hague. He has worked in both government and civil society capacities in Nigeria and has maintained an ongoing interest in the issue of demilitarization and public

insecurity, particularly with regard to the activity of nonstate actors. Jeffrey is currently completing a PhD at Cranfield University which focuses on a comparative analysis of the impact of demilitarization processes on levels of public insecurity in both Nigeria and South Africa.

Contact: j.o.isima@cranfield.ac.uk

Mehdi Lahlou

Mehdi Lahlou is a professor at the Institut National de Statistique et d'Économie Appliquée (INSEA) in Rabat. He holds a PhD in Economic Science from Sorbonne University in Paris (1982). In 1983 he joined the INSEA as a researcher and lecturer. His current research interests focus on comparative migration studies, labour and employment research.

Contact: melablou@hotmail.com

Christian Manahl

Christian Manahl holds a degree in Philosophy, Communications and Political Science from the University of Vienna and a degree in Philosophy from Sorbonne University in Paris. Currently he is Political Advisor of the EU Special Representative for the Sudan. Previously, he was with the Policy Unit of the High Representative of the EU for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Mr. Javier Solana, the Regional Political Advisor of the European Commission for the Horn of Africa, Eastern and Central Africa and with the Foreign Policy Unit of Directorate General for Development. He has been on field missions in Rwanda and Mozambique. His main interests are in the areas of regional security, peace and conflict and questions of political stability in African countries.

Contact: christian.manahl@consilium.eu.int

Torsten Moritz

PhD in political sciences at the FU Berlin (2000). He has research experience in Eastern and Central European transformation after 1989. In the late 1990s he was involved in the leadership of various pan-European Youth networks (General Secretary of the Ecumenical Youth Council in Europe, Vicechair of the World Student Christian Federation). Since 2002 Mr. Moritz has worked for the Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) as project secretary, was involved in CCME's advocacy work with the European Parliament and the European Commission as well as the Council of Europe and in the interregional global ecumenical network on uprooted of the World Council of Churches. He also is active in conceptualising and implementing a variety of projects and research initiatives, among other issues on migration and (co)development, trafficking in human beings, refugee resettlement and integration of third country nationals.

Contact: Torsten.Moritz@ccme.be

Siegmar Schmidt

Prof. Siegmar Schmidt holds a PhD in political sciences from the University of Munich (1987); he focused at that time on black trade union movements in the democratisation of South Africa. Subsequently he became professor at the University of Trier, the University of Mainz and finally at the University of Koblenz-Landau. His research is focused on international political science and the analysis of political systems in Eastern and Western Europe and in Africa. With regard to African countries, his particular interests are centred around governance systems and democratisation processes.

Contact: schmidts@uni-landau.de

Dieter Thränhardt

Is a political scientist, and he has headed political sciences at the University of Münster since 2001. He joined the University of Münster in 1980 and sub-

sequently held chairs in political sciences at the International Christian University in Tokyo, the Netherlands Institute for Advances Studies for Social Science and the Humanities in Wassenaar and the Humanities in Münster. His current research interests focus on German politics and contemporary history, comparative migration research and education and municipal politics.

Contact: thranha@uni-muenster.de

Olive Towey

works with Concern Worldwide, a NGO dealing with development issues. The organisation is based in Dublin and works in countries across the world, especially in Africa. Within Concern Worldwide, she works on External Relations. Her activities are in close cooperation with Eurostep, a European policy network based in Brussels. Furthermore, she is member of the CONCORD taskforce on Financial Perspectives.

Contact: olive.towey@concern.net

Alexis Valqui

is desk officer at the Division "Globalisation, Trade and Investment" at the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in Berlin, Germany. He graduated as an agricultural scientist from the Institute for Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences in the Tropics and Subtropics at the University of Hohenheim, Germany. From 1993 to 1997, he worked as a consultant for the Bolivian environmental NGO Eco Bolivia, the German Technical Cooperation Agency GTZ and the Venezuelan NGO Asociación Civil Para El Desarrollo del Municipio Bermudez, Ascibe. From 2000 to 2004, he was project coordinator at the technical cooperation division at the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) in Brunswick, where he was responsible for infrastructure projects in Bolivia and Chile as well as for other regional projects in Latin America.

Contact: alexis.valqui@bmz.bund.de

VII. Annex

1. "The EU and Africa: Towards a strategic partnership" (Council of the European Union)

COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION

EN

Brussels, 19 December 2005
15961/05 (Presse 367)

**THE EU AND AFRICA: TOWARDS A STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIP**

The European Council, at its meeting on 15 and 16 December, adopted the following text:

"Introduction: Our Vision

1. Europe and Africa are bound together by history, by geography, and by a shared vision of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future for all their peoples.

P R E S S

Rue de la Loi 175 B - 1048 BRUSSELS Tel.: +32 (0)2 285 6083 / 6319 Fax: +32 (0)2 285 8026
press.office@comsilium.eu.int http://ec.eu.int/Newsroom
15961/05 (Presse 367)

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EN

2. This strategy sets out the steps the European Union will take with Africa between now and 2015 to support African efforts to build such a future. It is a strategy of the whole of the EU for the whole of Africa. It takes into account regional and country-specific needs and African countries' national strategies. Its primary aims are the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the promotion of sustainable development, security and good governance, in Africa.
3. The strategy builds on important progress made by the Africans themselves. Its core principles are partnership based on international law and human rights, equality and mutual accountability. Its underlying philosophy is African ownership and responsibility, including working through African institutions.

Peace and security

4. Without peace there can be no lasting development. Without African leadership to end African conflicts there can be no lasting peace. So we will:
 - a) Work with the African Union (AU), sub-regional organisations and African countries to predict, prevent and mediate conflict, including by addressing its root causes, and to keep the peace in their own continent. In particular, we will strengthen the Africa Peace Facility with substantial, long-term, flexible, sustainable funding. We will help develop African capabilities, such as the AU's African Standby Force, and will build on existing activities by Member States to provide training and advisory, technical, planning and logistical support.
 - b) Provide direct support to African Union, sub-regional or UN efforts to promote peace and stability through Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) activities, and military and civilian crisis management missions, including potential deployment of EU battlegroups; continue implementation of the ESDP Africa Action Plan; and develop the dialogue with Euromed countries.
 - c) Enhance our support for post conflict reconstruction in Africa, so that we secure lasting peace and development. We will support in particular the new UN Peacebuilding Commission; the strengthening of fragile states; and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, and Security Sector Reform programmes in African states.
 - d) Redouble our efforts to stem the illicit flow of weapons, including small arms. We will encourage others to adopt minimum common standards and associate themselves with the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports, discourage transfers which contribute to instability, develop ways to share and act on information on illegal trafficking and support border management controls and an international arms trade treaty.

- e) Join with African states to counter terrorism worldwide. We will provide technical assistance, enhanced information sharing and support to the AU Anti-Terrorism Centre in Algiers and continue to support the implementation of international counter-terrorism agreements.

Human Rights and Governance

5. Successful development requires; adherence to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law; and effective, well-governed states, and strong and efficient institutions. We will:
 - a) Promote and protect human rights, including the rights of women, children and other vulnerable groups; help end impunity, including through the International Criminal Court; and promote fundamental freedoms and respect for the rule of law in Africa, including through capacity-building for judicial systems, national Human Rights Commissions and civil society organisations. The substantial funding under EC and member states' bilateral programmes will be maintained.
 - b) Support good governance programmes at country level and help build the capacity of the African Union and Africa's regional and national institutions, building on the € 35 million already allocated for this purpose under the Africa Peace Facility and the € 50 million under EDF 9.
 - c) Support, through political dialogue and consultations with African partners, African efforts to monitor and improve governance, including through supporting the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)'s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This should result in their goal of four completed reviews a year from 2006 being achieved and the development of a Governance Initiative to support national reforms triggered by the APRM process. Develop a governance facility in the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument.
 - d) Support the fight against corruption, human trafficking, illegal drugs and organised crime and promote transparency to meet the aspirations of African citizens and to ensure Africa's wealth benefits its people. This will include helping improve public accountability and financial management systems in Africa, early ratification by all EU member states and African partners of the UN Convention on Corruption, assisting proper management of conflict resources including timber as well as mineral resources, support to the Kimberly Process and to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) so that eleven African countries begin implementation of the EITI by July 2006.

e) Support the growth of participatory democracy and accountability in Africa, including through support to African parliaments and civil society and an enhanced programme of election assistance and EU Electoral Observation Missions including a review of their remit in 2006.

Development Assistance

6. If Africa is to meet the challenge of development, sound policies and good leadership must be backed by increased, sustainable and predictable financial flows at a level consistent with our ambitions. We will:
- a) Increase our aid, by delivering on our collective commitment to give as official development assistance 0.56% of EU GNI by 2010, with half of the additional €20 billion going to Africa, and 0.7% of GNI by 2015 in the case of 15 Member States, whilst other MS will strive to increase their ODA to 0.33% by 2015.¹
- b) Secure more effective and predictable EU financial assistance for Africa, including by reaching early agreement on a successor to the 9th European Development Fund as soon as possible and ensuring adequate resources for North Africa in future EC budgets.
- c) In order to help to reach the 0.7% target for development assistance, implement on a voluntary basis, innovative financing mechanisms, such as a contribution on airline tickets or through financing the International Finance Facility for Immunisation.
- d) Support the proposal, agreed in principle with the International Financial Institutions, to cancel outstanding debts owed by Heavily Indebted Poor Countries that qualify by helping to meet the costs. This is expected to deliver in total further debt relief of up to € 42 billion for African countries.
- e) Reinforce EU humanitarian and disaster response capability by strengthening the EC humanitarian aid department (ECHO) so that it maintains its strong role in under-funded emergencies, in support of the UN's lead.
- f) Make our aid more effective, by ensuring early implementation for Africa of our EU and international commitments, as agreed in Paris in March 2005.

¹ The full text, accompanied by the relevant minutes statements, is set out in the Conclusions of the Council of 24 May 2005 (Ref 9266/05).

Sustainable Economic Growth, Regional Integration and Trade

7. Rapid, sustained and broad-based growth is essential for ending poverty in Africa. We will:
- a) Facilitate a better-connected Africa, to itself and the rest of the world; including by establishing an EU/Africa Infrastructure Partnership, which will be complementary to the new Infrastructure Consortium for Africa and include existing initiatives on transport and to facilitate peoples' access to water and sanitation, energy and information technology.
- b) Promote a stable, efficient and harmonized legal business framework in Africa, for example by convening a Euro-African Business Forum in 2006.
- c) Help to integrate Africa fully into the world trade system, by pressing for a successful outcome to the Doha Round of world trade talks that is ambitious, maximises development gains, ensures special differential treatment, addresses preference erosion and makes trade work for the poor, and extends duty and quota-free market access for Least Developed Countries to all industrialised country markets.
- d) Provide increased aid for trade, building on the Community's commitment of € 1 billion per year by 2010.
- e) Agree Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with Africa's regional groupings by 2008 that are instruments of development, promote regional integration, improve African access to European and regional markets; support asymmetric and flexible implementation of EPAs; and reduce non-tariff barriers. We will closely monitor EPAs so that they help achieve development objectives; and also redouble efforts to complete by 2010 agreement on an EU-Mediterranean Free Trade Area.
- f) Help African countries comply with EU rules and standards, establish clear rules for services, simplify rules of origin and make them more development friendly.
- g) Support Africa in countering the effects of climate change in accordance with the EU Action Plan on Climate Change and Development; and in protecting its environment, through a range of policies, by combating desertification and ensuring the sustainable management of its forests, land and biodiversity fisheries and water. Such support includes, for example, € 500million for the EU Water Facility and € 220 million for the Energy Facility under EDF9.

Investing in people

8. A successful Africa requires a well-educated, healthy population and the full empowerment of women. We will:
- a) Support African efforts to ensure that all children have free primary education of good quality by 2015, including through the implementation of Africa's Education for All programme, with increased resources for the Fast Track Initiative, such as the € 63 million agreed under EDF9; and through the plan agreed at the 2005 Barcelona Summit.
 - b) Promote development of Euro-Africa networks of universities and centres of excellence, including through helping the AU establish a new exchange programme (the Nyerere Programme) for students in Africa.
 - c) Provide predictable, multi-year financing for health systems in Africa so that all Africans have access to basic healthcare, free where governments choose to provide this and in support of African governments' goal of allocating 15% of their public budgets to Health.
 - d) Enhance our support for the fight against infectious diseases, including by providing further EU contributions to the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and malaria, thereby maintaining the EU's share of global contributions (at least 50%). We will continue to support research and development of drugs for AIDS and other communicable diseases, and help countries deliver prevention strategies and universal access to HIV treatment and care for all who need it by 2010, through further support for the EU Programme for Action for AIDS, TB and malaria; and support fair access to drugs under WTO patent protection rules.
 - e) Improve food security for the most vulnerable, by helping lift 8 million Africans out of hunger by 2009 through country-led safety-nets for chronically food insecure populations who rely on humanitarian programmes.
 - f) Maximise the developmental benefits and minimize the negative aspects of migration and strengthen protection for refugees, through engaging in balanced dialogue and cooperation with the AU, other African organisations and states on a broad range of migration issues. In particular this means addressing the root causes of migration, fostering links with development and promoting co-development¹ and combating illegal immigration. We will take this forward through a series of concrete priority actions as agreed by the European Council.

¹ Co-development involves migrant communities in the EU contributing to the development of their countries of origin

g) Recognise the importance of women in all our policies towards Africa in view of their crucial role in economic growth, development, education and the disproportionate effects on women of conflict, poverty related diseases and lack of maternal health care; and give appropriate support to sexual and reproductive rights, in line with the International Conference on Population and Development Cairo agenda.

The future: an EU partnership with Africa

9. Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa. Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this. We commit to:
- a) Deliver on this strategy. We will review progress on its implementation at the December 2006 European Council, and at least every two years thereafter. Our Ministers will discuss and oversee the development of detailed delivery and monitoring plans for this purpose, based on timelines and indicators proposed jointly by the Commission and Council Secretariat. In 2006, the Council will review implementation of the aid volume targets agreed in May 2005 and thereafter, on the basis of monitoring reports from the Commission.
 - b) Develop this strategy, in partnership with the African Union, NEPAD and other African partners, respecting the principles of African ownership, the importance of working more closely with Africans in multilateral fora, and in coordination with multilateral partners.
 - c) Building on the Cairo Summit, enhance the EU's political dialogue and broader relationship with Africa and its institutions, and hold the second EU/Africa Summit in Lisbon as soon as possible."

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung



The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) was founded in 1925 as a political legacy of Germany's first democratically elected president, Friedrich Ebert. As a cultural non-profit institution, it is committed to the ideas and basic values of social democracy. In its extensive activities, the foundation serves the following aims:

- furthering political and social education of individuals from all walks of life in the spirit of democracy and pluralism,
- facilitating access to university education and research for gifted young people by providing scholarships,
- contributing to international understanding and cooperation.

The FES maintains its own representatives in 70 countries of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. The foundation engages in projects in the fields of sociopolitical development and economic and social promotion. The FES sees its activities in developing countries as a contribution to:

- promoting peace and understanding between peoples and inside the partner countries,
- supporting the democratisation of the State and society and strengthening the civil society,
- improving general political, economic and social conditions,
- reinforcing trade unions,
- developing independent media structures,
- facilitating regional and worldwide cooperation between states and different interest groups · gaining recognition for human rights.

Further information: www.fes.de

terre des hommes



terre des hommes, founded in 1967, is an aid organisation focussing on children and supporting about 350 projects in 28 countries. These include school and training projects, initiatives for street children, working children, child prostitutes and refugee children. It also runs food security and healthcare programmes.


terre des homes helps people to liberate themselves from oppression and economic hardship. It seeks to empower them to try out their own ideas about a life lived in dignity. We do not send outfield workers, preferring to promote local initiatives. With money, advice and networking facilities.

terre des homes endeavours — through campaigns, lobbying and publicity — to influence German political and business circles in the interest of children suffering hunger, exploitation or the aftermath of war.

terre des homes endeavours — through campaigns, lobbying and publicity — to influence decision makers in the interest of children suffering hunger, exploitation or the aftermath of war. Terre des homes action groups are groups of volunteers in 150 German towns and cities. They work on development-related issues at the local level, organising events, sitting on refugee councils and raising funds for projects. The regional offices of terre des homes guarantee the direct contact to the partner organisations, efficient accompaniment and local co-ordination of projects.

Further information: www.tdh.de

World Economy, Ecology & Development (WEED)



weed

WEED was founded in 1990 to boost the advocacy in the Federal Republic of Germany of alleviating global poverty and resolving international environmental problems. WEED campaigns for a course correction in international economic and development policies that would put more emphasis on social justice and environmental sustainability. Its aim is to create more awareness in this respect and develop and implement concrete political alternatives. WEED systematically analyses global economic, environmental and socio-political issues, linking the vision of a socially equitable and environmentally sustainable society to action and policy reform.

WEED is active in the following areas:

- the international debt crises
- IMF & World Bank policies, projects and programmes
- reform and democratisation of international financial markets
- international trade and investment policy (WTO)
- corporate accountability
- international and European environment and development policy

Further information: www.weed-online.org



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